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Ricci’s “Color-Blind” Standard in a Race Conscious 
Society: A Case of Unintended Consequences? 
Michael J. Zimmer 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Ricci v. DeStefano,1 the Supreme Court, in an opinion by 
Justice Kennedy, ruled as a matter of law that the City of New 
Haven had committed intentional disparate treatment 
discrimination. The City had violated Title VII2 by deciding not to 
use the results of a test given to promote firefighters to openings as 
lieutenants and captains.3 Plaintiffs were seventeen whites and one 
Hispanic who would have been promoted if the test results were 
used. The City defended its decision by asserting that it acted to 
avoid Title VII disparate impact liability to African-American and 
Hispanic test takers who would not be promoted if the test scores 
were used.  
Because the Court found a conflict between disparate treatment 
law and disparate impact law—a conflict that had not previously 
existed—it created a defense to a disparate treatment claim based on 
disparate impact law. To rely on the potential disparate impact 
liability as a defense to disparate treatment liability, the defendant 
would have to prove that it had a “strong basis in evidence” that it 
would be liable for disparate impact discrimination. Despite finding 
 
   Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago; Professor of Law Emeritus, Seton 
Hall University. My thanks to Charlie Sullivan and Rebecca Hanner White for all they have 
taught me about employment discrimination law. The input from participants at Faculty 
Workshops at Northwestern law school and the University of Georgia law school have proved 
to be especially useful as this article was being developed. Allen Kamp, Mayer Freed, John 
McGinnis, and Charlie Sullivan were especially helpful. Thanks to Loyola University Chicago 
law school for its research funding and other support. Finally, thanks to Margaret L. Moses for 
all her help in too many ways to mention.  
 1. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
 2. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006). 
 3. The Court reversed summary judgment for the defendants and, in an unusual move, 
granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. To do that, it had to find that no material issues 
of fact existed and so plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. That makes the 
careful analysis of the opinion in light of facts the Court found indisputably true and sufficient 
to support its decision extremely important.  
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that it faced a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, the 
Court found as a matter of law that the City had failed to prove it 
had that strong basis in evidence that it would have violated the 
disparate impact provisions of Title VII if it had used the test scores 
for promotions. The decision has already drawn significant and 
interesting commentary.4  
This Article will principally focus on the threshold issue of 
disparate treatment law, to which the Court paid little attention, 
rather than on the disparate impact issues on which the Court 
devoted most of its opinion. The thesis of this Article is that it is 
possible that a conservative majority of the Supreme Court 
 
 4.  See Barbara Jean D’Acquila, A Management Employment Lawyer’s Perspective on 
Ricci v. DeStefano, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 213 (2010) (highlighting the challenge facing 
employers and their lawyers because of Ricci); Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, 
Reading Ricci: White(ning) Discrimination, Race-ing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV 
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507344 (undertaking a deep and 
thorough investigation of the case to demonstrate that antidiscrimination law no longer 
provides a level playing field for minority plaintiffs because the law grants white plaintiffs 
significant advantages); Melissa Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court’s 2008–2009 
Labor and Employment Cases, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 253 (2009) (using Ricci as a 
prime example of the “procedural extremism” of the Court by reversing summary judgment 
for defendant and granting it to the plaintiffs); Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate 
Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010) (desribing Ricci as at least a partial step toward a 
“color-blind” standard for both Title VII disparate treatment law and constitutional equal 
protection law); Joseph A. Seiner & Benjamin N. Gutman, The New Disparate Impact, 90 
B.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1564244 
(developing what they see as an emerging employer affirmative defense to a disparate impact 
case based on its good faith when it took an action that has been challenged); Kerri Stone, The 
Unexpected Appearance of Transferred Intent in Title VII, 55 LOY. L. REV. 751 (2010) 
(exploring ways to think about the new approach that finds liability for action taken “because 
of race” in a general sense that is not directed at the particular plaintiffs adversely affected and 
placing the decision in a procedural context by viewing it as an expansion of the doctrine of 
“transferred intent” or “third party standing”); Michael Subit, A Plaintiffs’ Employment 
Lawyer’s Perspective on Ricci v. DeStefano, 25 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199 (2010) 
(acknowledging that the “majority took a very expansive view of disparate treatment” in Ricci, 
and arguing that it is actually bad for minority employees because it is a precursor to finding 
the disparate impact provisions of Title VII to violate equal protection); Charles Sullivan, Ricci 
v. DeStefano: End of the Line or Just Another Turn on the Disparate Impact Road?, 104 NW. U. 
L. REV. COLLOQUOY 201 (2009), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/ 
colloquy/2009/40/LRColl2009n40Sullivan.pdf (analyzing the effect Ricci has on the 
disparate impact doctrine and the relationship between disparate impact and disparate 
treatment and suggesting the need for Congressional amendments to Title VII to overturn 
Ricci); Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1538525 (discussing Ricci in context with the 
background development of the disparate impact doctrine); Howard Wasserman, Ricci Glitch, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Jul. 6, 2009, 6:46 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/ 
2009/07/ricci-glitch.html. 
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inadvertently created new arguments for civil rights advocates 
representing women and minority group men, the groups for whose 
protection antidiscrimination statutes were enacted in the first 
instance. The palpable empathy the majority felt for the Ricci 
plaintiffs may have caused a majority of the Court to leap to a 
finding of discrimination as a matter of law, thereby transforming 
disparate treatment law to now make it easier for all plaintiffs to 
prove their cases.  
In short, the Court appears to have established essentially a 
“color-blind” standard of disparate treatment liability for Title VII.5 
A “color-blind” standard requires that an employer not know the 
racial consequences of the employment actions it takes. The violation 
of the “color-blind” standard leads to disparate treatment liability if 
the plaintiff proves that (1) the defendant knew the racial 
consequences of its decision, (2) it then made that decision in light 
of that knowledge, thus making the decision “because of race,” and 
(3) the plaintiff suffered the effect of an adverse employment action. 
The Court accepted that the City’s motivation for its action was 
benevolent in the sense that it was taken to avoid disparate impact 
liability to minority group test takers. In other words, the City 
decided not to use the test scores “because of” the effect their use 
would have on African-American and Hispanic test takers. The fact 
that the City was assumed to have acted benevolently as to some of 
the members of all three racial groups affected—or at least members 
of the two minority groups affected—was irrelevant to liability to a 
different group, the Ricci plaintiffs, which included one minority 
group member. The defendant was liable to these plaintiffs who were 
adversely affected by the decision even though the decision was 
made in spite of their race, not because of it.6 
 
 5. The Court indicated that equal protection constitutional principles provide guidance 
in the Title VII context. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2675. Richard Primus further develops the point 
that this same standard applies to the constitutional law of equal protection as well as Title VII 
disparate treatment. See Primus, supra note 4, at 1344.  
 6. In creating this new test of disparate treatment discrimination, Justice Kennedy did 
recognize one exception where an employer shows that at the time it took action knowing its 
racial consequences it was in the design phase for an employment policy or practice, before it 
had been finalized for use. See discussion infra notes 67–71. The Court also gave some 
emphasis, if not making it an element of the Ricci “color-blind” test, to the reliance interests 
of the Ricci plaintiffs and their expectation that the test results would be used. It may be that 
the discussion about these plaintiffs’ reliance efforts and their expectation that the test scores 
would be used is more relevant to the third element of the new test—that the plaintiffs suffered 
an adverse employment action—than to the showing of intent to discriminate. See discussion 
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Part II describes the three different racial groups, with members 
of each racial group being represented in two groups depending on 
the outcome of the City’s decision not to use the test. Some 
members of each racial group would be favored if the test scores 
were not used, and some would be favored if the test results were 
used. In other words, all the test takers can be divided into six 
different groups depending on their race and on the effect the 
decision not to use the test scores for promotions had on them.  
Because the Court did not expressly adopt a “color-blind” test 
for disparate treatment liability, Part III sets out and tries to analyze 
what Justice Kennedy did say which, when all put together, supports 
the conclusion that the Court has adopted a “color-blind” standard 
that substantially broadens the scope of application of disparate 
treatment law. In doing so, the Court appeared to overturn prior 
disparate treatment law that had made it difficult for plaintiffs to 
prove their cases. Part IV fleshes out the elements of this new, Ricci 
“color-blind” basis for disparate treatment liability, while Part V 
discusses two subsequent claims against the City of New Haven now 
that the results of the test have been used to promote firefighters to 
lieutenant and captain openings. Part VI shows how this new, Ricci 
“color-blind” standard can be used to advance the general 
antidiscrimination agenda. Part VII sketches some of the broader 
potential impacts of Ricci in terms of equal protection law. Part VIII 
concludes the Article. 
II. RICCI’S THREE RACIAL GROUPS, EACH INCLUDING THOSE 
WHO WOULD BE PROMOTABLE AND THOSE WHO WOULD NOT BE 
PROMOTED 
Because Justice Kennedy does not explicitly adopt a “color-
blind” standard, understanding the change that the Court made to 
disparate treatment law requires careful analysis of the opinion and 
the facts that it found to support its conclusion that the City 
committed disparate treatment discrimination as a matter of law. 
Justice Kennedy begins by describing the outcome of the test in 
terms of its impact on the test takers who were members of the three 
different racial groups: 
 
infra notes 51–65. 
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Seventy-seven candidates completed the lieutenant examination—
43 whites, 19 blacks, and 15 Hispanics. Of those, 34 candidates 
passed—25 whites, 6 blacks, and 3 Hispanics. Eight lieutenant 
positions were vacant at the time of the examination. As the rule of 
three operated, this meant that the top 10 candidates were eligible 
for an immediate promotion to lieutenant. All 10 were white. 
Subsequent vacancies would have allowed at least 3 black 
candidates to be considered for promotion to lieutenant.  
Forty-one candidates completed the captain examination—25 
whites, 8 blacks, and 8 Hispanics. Of those, 22 candidates passed 
—16 whites, 3 blacks, and 3 Hispanics. Seven captain positions 
were vacant at the time of the examination. Under the rule of 
three, 9 candidates were eligible for an immediate promotion to 
captain—7 whites and 2 Hispanics.7 
Thus, the test scores had an impact on three different racial 
groups—whites, Hispanics, and African Americans—with members 
of each racial group represented among those who would be 
advantaged, either by being promoted or at least promotable, if the 
test results were used as well as in the group of those who could not 
be promoted if the test scores were used.  
Looking at the racial consequences flowing from the 
administration of the tests, there were six different groups: 
1. The 24 lower scoring African Americans who, if the City 
decided not to use the test scores, would have an improved 
chance for promotion if some alternative method were used 
to make the promotions. With no chance for promotion if 
 
 7. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2665 (citations omitted). The “rule of three” is common in civil 
service systems. It means that the employer is limited to selecting one of the top three scorers 
on the test and cannot take someone with a lower score. The Court held that as a matter of 
law the tests resulted in a disparate impact looking only at the pass rates, which did not tell the 
whole story of that impact since simply passing the test would not necessarily lead to 
promotion during the two year life span for using the tests: 
The racial adverse impact here was significant, and petitioners do not dispute that 
the City was faced with a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability. On the 
captain exam, the pass rate for white candidates was 64 percent but was 37.5 percent 
for both black and Hispanic candidates. On the lieutenant exam, the pass rate for 
white candidates was 58.1 percent; for black candidates, 31.6 percent; and for 
Hispanic candidates, 20 percent. The pass rates of minorities . . . were approximately 
one-half the pass rates for white candidates . . . . 
Id. at 2677–78. The E.E.O.C. has an 80% rule of thumb to determine whether disparate 
impact exists. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (D) (2008) (selection rate that is less than 80% “of the 
rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement 
agencies as evidence of adverse impact”). 
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the test results were used, any alternative would likely 
improve their prospects. But how much those prospects 
would improve would depend on what alternative promotion 
procedures would be used. 
2. The 20 lower scoring Hispanic test takers who, like the 24 
African-American test takers in group 1, would not have 
been promoted if the tests scores were used. 
3. The 51 lower scoring white test takers who would not be 
promoted if the test scores would be used. Like the African-
American and Hispanic test takers in groups 1 and 2, their 
chances for promotion improved by the City’s decision not 
to use the test scores because they had no chance for 
promotion if the test scores were used. 
4. The 17 white test takers who did score high enough to be 
promoted if the test scores were used. With the decision not 
to use the test scores, their chances for promotion declined. 
They lost what appeared to be a sure thing. As a result of the 
City’s decision, they would have some chance for promotion 
under whatever system the City would decide to use for 
promotions instead of the test scores. 
5. The 2 Hispanic test takers who scored high enough to be 
promoted if the test scores were used. Like the members of 
group 4, they have a reduced chance of promotion because 
they lost a sure thing.  
6. The 3 African-American test takers who might have a chance 
of promotion if the test results were used and if there were 
more openings over the two-year life span for the use of the 
test results. With the decision not to use the test scores, their 
chances for promotion probably would decline but it would 
be unknown until alternative promotion procedures were 
established. 
 
Table 1 shows the results as to all six groups:  
 
Table 1: Outcome by Racial Groups of Test 
 
 Whites Blacks Hispanics TOTAL 
Promotable  17 3 2 22 
Not Promotable 51 24 20 95 
TOTAL 68 27 22 117 
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The outcomes in terms of promotable or possibly promotable 
test takers if the test results were used would be that 25% of the 
white test takers would be promoted, as would 11.1% of the African 
Americans and 9% of the Hispanics. The Hispanic rate was a little 
more than one-third of the white rate and the African-American rate 
was less than half of the white rate. It is no wonder that the Court 
found that the test results would, as a matter of law, have a disparate 
impact on minority test takers.  
Table 2 shows the rates of promotion for the three groups and 
then compares the promotion rates of the African-American and 
Hispanic test takers to the promotion rate of the white test takers, 
the group that had the highest rate of promotion. 
 
Table 2: Comparative Rates of Promotion 
 
 Rate of Promotion Percentage of White 
Rate 
White 25%  
African American 11.1% 44.4% 
Hispanic 9% 36% 
 
Once the racial impact of this test became known to the City and 
the community—both as to the pass rate and its actual effect on the 
different racial groups8—the use of the scores became a hotly 
contested political issue. 
When the examination results showed that white candidates had 
outperformed minority candidates, the mayor and other local 
politicians opened a public debate that turned rancorous. Some 
firefighters argued the tests should be discarded because the results 
showed the tests to be discriminatory. They threatened a 
discrimination lawsuit if the City made promotions based on the 
tests. Other firefighters said the exams were neutral and fair. And 
they, in turn, threatened a discrimination lawsuit if the City, relying 
on the statistical racial disparity, ignored the test results and denied 
promotions to the candidates who had performed well. In the end 
the City took the side of those who protested the test results. It 
 
 8.  The identity of the individual test takers was not known to those engaged in the 
political debate or to the test takers themselves. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2666–67. 
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threw out the examinations.9 
Based on these facts, Justice Kennedy held that, as a matter of 
law, the City had engaged in disparate treatment discrimination, that 
is, intentional discrimination against the plaintiffs.10  
III. RICCI’S SIX STATEMENTS THAT ADOPT A “COLOR-BLIND” 
DISPARATE TREATMENT STANDARD 
The most significant question is why these facts support, as a 
matter of law, a finding of disparate treatment discrimination against 
these particular test takers—the 17 white and one Hispanic test 
takers—all of whom would be promoted if the tests results were 
used. That group did not include all of those who would be 
promoted or be promotable if the test results were used. Further, the 
Court did not point to any other evidence that the City’s decision 
was taken because of the race of these particular test takers. The 
answer the Court gave can be found by analyzing six separate 
statements that indicate why the City’s conduct amounted to 
disparate treatment discrimination. It is the thesis of this Article that, 
taken together, these statements mean that the Court has adopted a 
new, “color-blind” standard of disparate treatment liability. Because 
the “color-blind” standard was not explicitly adopted, the holding 
and the text of the Court’s opinion has to be parsed rather carefully, 
quote-by-quote, to unpack its potential meaning for disparate 
treatment law.  
First, and perhaps most important, the Court found that the City 
had committed disparate treatment discrimination as a matter of law, 
even though the City’s action was found as a matter of law to be 
motivated by its desire to avoid disparate impact liability. In finding 
disparate treatment discrimination to exist, the Court had to deal 
with the conflict created between an employer’s obligation to avoid 
both disparate treatment and disparate impact liability. This conflict 
had not previously been judicially recognized.11 Under the 
 
 9. Id. at 2664. 
 10. That finding set the stage for the Court’s extensive analysis of the facts in the record 
to support its finding that the City did not have a “strong basis in evidence” that it would be 
liable under disparate impact law if it used the test scores. While it created the “strong basis in 
evidence” defense to a disparate treatment claim, the Court held that, as a matter of law, the 
City did not satisfy that test. Id. at 2676–77. 
 11. The closest the Court has gotten to the issue arose in Los Angeles Department of 
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), a disparate treatment case challenging a 
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preexisting understanding, an employer was prohibited from acting 
with intent to discriminate—disparate treatment discrimination12—as 
well as prohibited from using an employment practice that caused a 
disparate impact on groups protected by Title VII unless the practice 
had been justified as job related and consistent with business 
necessity.13 Simply knowing the racial consequences of an 
employment action did not constitute acting with intent to 
discriminate. As long as the employer did not act with intent to 
discriminate, an employer could act knowing the racial consequences 
of its actions and thereby also avoid disparate impact liability.14  
The premise of Ricci is that acting with such knowledge is acting 
with intent to discriminate at least to a prima facie level. After Ricci, 
an employer could avoid both disparate treatment and disparate 
impact liability only where its action was justified by a “strong basis 
in evidence” that it would be liable for disparate impact 
discrimination if it failed to take account of race in making its 
 
retirement plan rule requiring women to contribute a higher percentage of their pay to the 
plan in order to get monthly retirement benefits equal to men’s benefits. In defense of this 
discriminatory policy, the defendant argued that a gender neutral pension plan would result in 
disparate impact discrimination against men because, as a group, they would receive less 
retirement income than women because of their group’s shorter life expectancy. In a footnote, 
the Court avoided deciding whether or not there was a conflict between disparate treatment 
and disparate impact theories. “[E]ach retiree’s total pension benefits are ultimately 
determined by his actual life span,” so that differences in total benefits received by retirees was 
because of their actual life spans and not because of sex. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 710 n.20. 
Further, even though such a neutral practice will inevitably have “some disproportionate 
impact on one group or another,” Griggs v. Duke Power Co. “does not imply . . . that 
discrimination must always be inferred from such consequences.” Id. Subsequently, in 
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1980), the Court decided that the fact that, at the bottom 
line, the employer’s selection process did not result in disparate impact against minority group 
members in general did not prevent employees affected by a particular element of the process 
that did produce an adverse impact from challenging that element. 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
 13. Id. § 2000e-2(k). 
 14. See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 315 (9th ed. 2008): 
[D]isparate treatment is not allowed because discriminatory intent is not a 
permissible basis for denying employment opportunities to individuals in our 
society; but even a nondiscriminatory motivation will not save practices that are not 
justified by business necessity and have the effect of falling more harshly on a 
protected group. So stated, disparate treatment and disparate impact principles seem 
to work in conjunctions to achieve the basic goal of Title VII. 
Id. This assumes that simply knowing the racial consequences of an action does not establish 
the intent to discriminate element of a disparate treatment case. 
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decision.15 In other words, acting with knowledge of the action’s 
racial consequences to take account of potential disparate impact 
liability constitutes disparate treatment discrimination without 
having that strong basis in evidence that it would be liable.  
As will be developed, the finding that a conflict existed between 
the obligations on employers to commit neither disparate treatment 
nor disparate impact discrimination could be based only on the fact 
that the City knew the racial consequences of its decision when it 
made it. The City knew the effect its decision would have on all the 
test takers in all three racial groups. Its motive for not using the test 
scores was because of the race of lower scoring members of the 
minority groups. Yet, the Court found this to be “because of [the] 
race” of the higher scoring test takers, which included members of 
all three racial groups.16 Thus, the best way to understand Ricci is 
that acting with knowledge of a particular decision’s racial 
consequences is disparate treatment discrimination because it violates 
a new “color-blind” standard of disparate treatment liability. 
Second, the following six statements made in the opinion do not 
expressly adopt a “color-blind” standard of disparate treatment 
liability.  They, nevertheless, lead ineluctably to the conclusion that 
what the City did that constituted disparate treatment discrimination 
was to act with knowledge of the racial consequences of its decision 
not to use the test results because that action had an adverse affect 
on some test takers who would have been promoted if the test scores 
had been used.  
The six statements that are key to understanding Ricci were set 
out in two groups of three. The first three come early in the 
discussion of what law applies to these facts and form the core 
findings that establish that there is now a “color-blind” standard of 
disparate treatment discrimination. The statements in the second set 
 
 15. A basis for the Court’s rejection of the City’s good faith in making the decision and 
its requirement that the City have a strong basis in evidence that it would be liable under the 
disparate impact theory may have been the Court’s fear that a good faith standard for resolving 
the conflict between disparate treatment and disparate impact discrimination would too readily 
allow an employer to resort to the use of racial quotas. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia 
adverts to the quota issue. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682. 
 16. Professor Stone analyzes this aspect of Ricci as the Court expanding the concept of 
“transferred intent”—the intent of the City’s action, because of the race of the lower scoring 
minority test takers, was transferred to become an intent to discriminate against the Ricci 
plaintiffs. Alternatively, she describes the case as expanding the “third party standing” doctrine. 
See Stone, supra note 4. 
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appear toward the end of the opinion. The first of that set 
summarizes the essence of this new standard—the “color-blind” 
standard. The second in that set explores the reliance or expectancy 
interests of the test takers to emphasize the seriousness of the harm 
caused by the City’s conduct. The final statement develops an 
exception to the “color-blind” standard of liability for employers 
who know the racial consequences of proposed employment 
practices during the design phase of those practices. 
 
1. All the evidence demonstrates that the City chose not 
to certify the examination results because of the 
statistical disparity based on race—i.e., how minority 
candidates had performed when compared to white 
candidates. As the District Court put it, the City 
rejected the test results because “too many whites 
and not enough minorities would be promoted were 
the lists to be certified.” . . . Without some other 
justification, this express, race-based decisionmaking 
violates Title VII’s command that employers cannot 
take adverse employment actions because of an 
individual’s race.17  
 
This first statement finds as fact that, before it acted, the City 
knew the distribution of test scores by racial groups, including the 
fact that there was adverse impact on minority test takers when 
compared to white test takers. It knew that the promotion rate for 
the group of white test takers was much higher than the rates for the 
Hispanic and African-American test takers: The Hispanic promotion 
rate was 36% of the rate for white test takers and the African-
American promotability rate was 44% of the white rate. Thus, the 
 
 17. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673 (citations omitted). In essence the City was replacing the 
test scores, which on the surface at least, were achieved in a “color-blind” way, with a decision 
not to use the test scores, which also on the surface at least, were achieved in a “color-blind” 
way: All members of all three racial groups were treated the same way since none of their test 
scores would be used for good or bad. What is different about Ricci and a situation where the 
employer cancelled the test because it learned that security had been breached when the test 
was administered? All of the test takers would be treated the same as all of the test takers in 
Ricci but it would be doubtful anyone would claim it was because of the race of any particular 
group of test takers. In Ricci, all the test takers were treated the same but the Court found that 
the City intended to discriminate against some of the test takers because of their race while 
others of the same and other races were also adversely affected by the decision. 
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Ricci plaintiffs established that the City was conscious of the 
consequences for the members of all three racial groups when it 
decided not to use the test scores. In essence, this confirms that the 
City knew that there would be a significant disparate impact on 
minority group members if the test results were used and that some 
test takers of all three races would not be promoted if the test scores 
were not used.18 Saying that this “express, race-based 
decisionmaking” is disparate treatment comes as close as the Court 
gets to articulating explicitly a “color-blind” standard. 
 
2. Whatever the City’s ultimate aim—however well intentioned 
or benevolent it might have seemed—the City made its 
employment decision because of race.19 
 
This statement drops from the case any issue or evidence of 
animus, prejudice or other motivation aimed at hurting the Ricci 
plaintiffs or, indeed, any of the test takers. Nevertheless, even 
without any evidence of animus or intent to discriminate against the 
Ricci plaintiffs, the decision by the City still was characterized as 
“because of race.” With no animus or other evidence of ill will 
toward anyone, the “because of race” could only be based on the 
fact that the City knew the racial effect its decision would have on all 
the test takers of all three racial groups, some of whom would benefit 
and some of whom would not if the test results were used. When the 
City acted with that knowledge, it was “because of race” in the 
abstract sense that the racial consequences of the action were known. 
But there was no evidence that the City focused in a negative way on 
the race of any individuals or of the members of any racial group. No 
one was treated differently because of their race, whether majority or 
minority. The Court found that the decision was “because of race” 
but not “because of” the race of the plaintiffs. In other words, 
“because of race” means an action that violates a “color-blind” 
standard. 
This is a substantial change in disparate treatment law. Before 
Ricci, proof that an actor was simply conscious of the race or gender 
 
 18. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607, 1607.4(D).    
 19. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674. So, the City acted “because of” the race of those minority 
test takers who did not score highly enough to be promoted or be promotable and not 
“because of” the race of those test takers, including members of all three racial groups, who 
did score highly enough.  
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of the affected individuals would not support drawing an inference of 
the intent to discriminate, the most difficult element in a claim of 
disparate treatment discrimination.20 For example, Justice O’Connor, 
in her concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,21 made it 
clear that intent to discriminate could not be found solely on the fact 
that the race or gender of the person affected by the decision is 
known to the decisionmaker:  
Race and gender always “play a role” in . . . the benign sense 
that these are human characteristics of which decisionmakers 
are aware and about which they may comment in a perfectly 
neutral and non-discriminatory fashion. For example, . . . 
mere reference to “a lady candidate” might show that gender 
“played a role” in the decision, but by no means could 
support a rational factfinder’s inference that the decision was 
made “because of” sex.22 
After Ricci, it can be argued that the only factual basis for the 
Court’s determination that the City’s action in deciding not to use 
the test results was “because of race” was simply that it acted 
knowing the racial consequences—the effect on all of the white, 
African-American, and Hispanic test takers—of that decision. Acting 
to avoid negative consequences to some minority group test takers 
made the decision “because of [the] race” of others, the 17 white 
and one Hispanic plaintiffs plus another Hispanic test taker who 
would be promoted if the test scores were used and three African-
American test takers who might be promoted over the useful life of 
the test. While Price Waterhouse involved a situation where the 
decisionmakers knew the gender of an individual candidate for 
partnership, Ricci involved a larger group but it is not clear why that 
would make a difference in the analysis. After all, in Price 
Waterhouse, the gender of all of the candidates considered for 
partnership was known to the group making partnership decisions, 
though a discrimination case was brought by only one of them, Ann 
 
 20. Under prior law, an individual disparate treatment case required proof of three 
elements: (1) defendant’s intent to discriminate; (2) plaintiff suffering an adverse employment 
action; and (3) joining defendant’s intent to discriminate to the adverse employment action 
plaintiff suffered, with that last linkage element proved either to the “but-for” level or to “a 
motivating factor” level. For a full development of those elements, see Michael J. Zimmer, A 
Chain of Inferences Proving Discrimination, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1243 (2008).  
 21. 490 U.S. 228 (1988). 
 22. Id. at 277. 
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Hopkins. Based on the evidence the Court refers to in Ricci, it 
applies this new, “color-blind” standard of what constitutes disparate 
treatment to find liability when a decisionmaker knows the racial 
consequences of an action that it takes. Anyone adversely affected by 
a decision made under such circumstances would be able to bring an 
action for disparate treatment discrimination.  
Unlinking liability from any showing that the employer focused 
on the race of those affected helps explain why the Court found 
disparate treatment against the 17 white and one Hispanic who were 
the Ricci plaintiffs, without regard to the fact that those adversely 
affected included members of two different racial groups.23 It is 
reduced to a simple, straightforward case determined by whether or 
not the defendant knew the race of those affected by the decision 
and whether or not at least one person was adversely affected by the 
defendant’s decision.  
Putting together the first two statements, there is disparate 
treatment discrimination when an employer acts with knowledge of 
how different racial groups would be affected since acting with that 
knowledge, even if motivated by a desire to avoid harm to some 
members of two racial groups, makes the decision “because of race” 
of some of the members of all three racial groups.  
If the decisonmaker knew the race of those affected by its action, 
whether positively or negatively, the employer is liable unless it had a 
sufficient justification for its disparate treatment. This is an extreme 
standard but is consistent with what Richard Primus calls his 
“general reading” of Ricci.24 From the viewpoint of civil rights 
plaintiffs, this new standard would make it much easier than under 
the preexisting law to establish disparate treatment liability: Evidence 
that the decisionmaker knew the racial consequences in general of its 
action suffices to establish liability if the plaintiff was adversely 
affected by the action, even if there was no evidence that the action 
was taken “because of” the race of that plaintiff. Liability would be 
established even if the action was taken in spite of the plaintiff’s race 
because it was taken to benefit the members of the same as well as 
the other racial groups.25  
 
 23.  Another Hispanic, who did not join the Ricci action, also lost his immediate 
promotion when the City decided not to use the test and three African Americans lost the 
chance to be promoted during the period in which the test results would be used. 
 24. Primus, supra note 4, at 1363. 
 25. Evidence that the decisionmaker was not “color-blind” is not necessary to proving 
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3. The City rejected the test results solely because the higher 
scoring candidates were white.26 
 
This statement is intriguing for its finding that the action of the 
City was “solely because the higher scoring candidates were white.”27 
The word “solely” gives one pause since there is no evidence that the 
City acted other than because it knew all the scores as they affected 
the members of all three racial groups and acted to avoid adversely 
affecting the members of the two minority groups. As the Court 
acknowledged, it inevitably follows from the City’s announced 
reason for not using the test scores—the test results would cause a 
disparate impact on minority group members—that the City also 
knew that the white candidates, as a group, scored higher. Because a 
disparate impact showing by its nature is a comparison of outcomes 
between two racial groups,28 the facts here would also just as readily 
support a finding that the City acted “solely” because the scores of 
minority test takers taken as groups were too low when compared 
with the scores of the group of white test takers.29 That, of course, is 
the explanation the City claimed was the basis of its decision not to 
use the test results, which claim the Court accepted. That being true, 
it is hard to square the use of the word “solely” in reference to the 
test scores of either the white or of either minority group of test 
takers, especially since some members of all three racial groups were 
affected positively and others were affected negatively by the decision 
not to use the test results. The evidence the Court relied on showed 
that the City acted with knowledge of the test scores of all of the test 
takers, at least by their representation in the three different racial 
 
discrimination under previous authority for proof of intent to discriminate. For a description of 
the various ways of proving intent to discriminate to which the Ricci approach should be 
added, see Zimmer, supra note 20. 
 26. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674 (2009). 
 27. Id. (emphasis added). It is, of course, true that the City acted because of the racial 
consequences of using the test scores. That is not in dispute. What is in dispute is whether it 
acted because of the adverse racial consequences—i.e., “because of” the race of the seventeen 
white and one Hispanic plaintiff.  
 28. The Court recognized that fact with its statement that the City acted because it 
knew the “statistical disparity based on race—i.e., how minority candidates had performed 
when compared to white candidates.” Id. at 2673. 
 29. That is, after all, what disparate impact means. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2010 1:04:18 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
1272 
groups of test takers. Thus, the decision was “solely” because of the 
known racial consequences of all the test takers.  
Justice Kennedy does not explain how “because of race” was 
linked solely to the race of this group of some of the white test takers, 
when there were test takers from the two other racial groups who 
were also adversely affected when the City decided not to use the 
test scores. That these white test takers would be adversely affected 
by the decision not to use the test results was clear but it would also 
be clear for the higher scoring members of the two other racial 
groups. The impact on all the lower scoring test takers who were 
represented in all three racial groups was also clear: Their chance for 
promotion improved to something better than no chance at all. 
Putting all this together, the City was found to have acted with an 
intent to discriminate against this particular set of test takers, 
including the Ricci plaintiffs (and the one Hispanic who did not join 
in the suit), “because of their race” where that finding is based 
simply on the City’s knowledge of the racial consequences of its 
decision as to all the test takers.  
Since the Court assumed there was no evidence of animus 
against these particular white test takers (or anyone else), a “color-
blind” standard would support a finding that the City’s decision 
constituted disparate treatment of all of the test takers but would not 
support a finding that the decision was “solely” because of the race 
of one particular group of test takers—the higher scoring white test 
takers. A possible way of interpreting the term “solely” here is that 
the Court assumed that this subset of all the white test takers was the 
only group adversely affected by the City’s decision not to use the 
test results.30  
To put this into the context of the preexisting disparate 
treatment law, Justice Kennedy may have used the “solely because” 
language to bolster the Court’s apparent finding as a matter of law 
that this group satisfied the separate, “adverse employment action” 
element of a disparate treatment case.31 While a decision that was not 
 
 30. The opinion of Justice Kennedy exhibited such a strong empathy for the high 
scoring white test takers that he may have been blinded to the actual fact that high scoring 
members of the other two racial groups also were adversely affected by the decision not to use 
the test scores. That a present majority of the Court is sensitive to the claims of whites, rather 
than of minority groups, is a point strongly made by Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 4. 
 31. See Minor v. Centocor, Inc., 457 F.3d 632, 634 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[H]undreds if 
not thousands of decisions say that an ‘adverse employment action’ is essential to the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case . . . .”). 
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“color-blind” would be “because of [the] race” of all those affected, 
positively or negatively, only those who were adversely affected 
would be able to challenge that decision. A problem with that 
interpretation is what to do with one of the plaintiffs in Ricci who 
was a Hispanic test taker disadvantaged in exactly the same way as 
the group of white test takers who sued the City. Thus, unless the 
term “white” was simply a misstatement because Justice Kennedy 
overlooked the fact that one plaintiff was not white,32 so that the 
term meant all the plaintiffs in this case, it is counterfactual to say 
that the decision was made “solely because the higher scoring 
candidates were white.” The Hispanic plaintiff cannot be 
differentiated from the other Ricci plaintiffs except as to his race. 
This supports the finding that the challenged decision need not be 
focused on the particular plaintiffs, or even the race of the particular 
plaintiffs, if the decisionmaker knew the racial consequences of its 
decision. 
Even if the term “white” was mistakenly meant to include the 
one Hispanic plaintiff or was a mistaken description of all of the 
Ricci plaintiffs, that interpretation still cannot be squared with the 
record in the case. The evidence referred to by Justice Kennedy 
shows that there was another Hispanic who would have been 
promoted if the tests were used but who did not join in the Ricci 
lawsuit. While he was adversely affected by the City’s decision in the 
same way as the Ricci plaintiffs, was he somehow not within the 
scope of the City’s discrimination that the Court found against these 
plaintiffs? 
It might be possible to interpret the Court’s statement indicating 
that the City focused its intent to discriminate only on the white test 
takers, and not on the rest of the group of high scorers in the other 
two racial groups, without regard to who ended up suing. To say 
that another way, perhaps the Court is suggesting that the City was 
motivated to decide not to use the tests because of the high test 
scores of some white test takers, even though there were other high 
scorers in the other racial groups affected in the same way. That 
would make the group who were the victims of the City’s intent to 
discriminate under-inclusive of all those who were disadvantaged by 
 
 32. Overlooking the fact that one plaintiff was an Hispanic is an example of the 
extraordinary empathy exhibited by the Court’s opinion focused on the white test takers who 
got high scores.  
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that decision.33 Proof of such unequal treatment would be classic 
evidence of intent to discriminate in a disparate treatment case 
brought under preexisting law.34  
The problem with that analysis is that there is no evidence to 
support it. Justice Kennedy did not point to any evidence that the 
City, out of all the test takers, picked just the white test takers who 
scored high enough to be promoted if the test scores were used and 
discriminated against them rather than the larger group of high 
scoring test takers from all three racial groups who were adversely 
affected. If there was evidence to support a finding that the City 
intended to discriminate against only a subset of all those who scored 
highly enough to be promotable, that would be inconsistent with 
the Court’s assumption that the City’s decision was “well 
intentioned or benevolent.” But, there is no indication that such 
evidence was in the record upon which the Court decided the case as 
a matter of law. 
Beyond the under-inclusion of the two Hispanic test takers who 
would be promoted immediately if the test scores were used, there 
were three African-American test takers who scored high enough 
that they might be promoted over the life span of the test should 
more lieutenant and captain positions open up. These African 
Americans were not exactly in the same situation as the two Hispanic 
and 17 white test takers who would be promoted to fill existing 
openings, but they did lose some real chance to be promoted when 
the City decided not to use the tests. There is no evidence that the 
City had any intent to discriminate against them, even though they 
were disadvantaged by the City’s decision.  
Finding that the City made its decision “solely because the 
higher scoring candidates were white,” without any evidence to 
support that conclusion, is at odds with prior law. Until Ricci, a 
finding of disparate treatment discrimination required that the 
challenged decision was made because of its effect on the plaintiffs, 
not despite it. In the context of equal protection law, the Court, in 
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,35 found that an 
 
 33. The concept of “under-inclusion”—the classification covered some but not all of 
those who were similarly situated—is an equal protection concept. See Joseph Tussman & 
Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 348–53 (1949). 
 34. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98–101  (2003); McDonald v. Santa Fe 
Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
 35.  442 U.S. 256 (1979). For a Title VII case finding no liability “because of” sex in 
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absolute preference for hiring military veterans at a time when men 
were 98% of the veterans was not intentional discrimination against 
women even though almost all women were disqualified if even one 
veteran applied for any particular job. The Feeney Court noted:  
“Discriminatory purpose,” however, implies more than intent 
as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies 
that the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, 
selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in 
part “because of,” not merely “in spite of,” its adverse effects 
upon an identifiable group.36 
This is the opposite of what the Ricci Court did in finding the 
City liable where it acted “in spite of” the race of the plaintiffs. 
Although the City surely knew that deciding not to use the test 
would disadvantage the white and Hispanic test takers who would be 
promoted if the test were used, as well as the African-American test 
takers who in the future might be promoted if the test results were 
implemented, the evidence alluded to by Justice Kennedy appears to 
only support the conclusion that the City made its decision to avoid 
disparate impact liability to minority test takers “in spite of,” rather 
than “because of,” its impact on any of the high test scorers of any 
race.37 
With no evidence of animus aimed at any individuals or at the 
members of any racial group, the term “solely” is incoherent unless 
what is meant by a decision being “because of race” was that it 
violated a “color-blind” standard. If action taken “in spite of” its 
impact on some members of all three racial groups suffices to 
establish that the action was “because of race” of some members of 
all three groups that only makes sense if the “color-blind” standard is 
used. The “color-blind” standard appears to impose a flat 
prohibition on an employer acting when it knows the race of those 
affected, even if there is no proof that its action was intended to hurt 
those adversely affected because of their race.  
 
face of an extremely strong and unrebutted statistical showing of impact, see EEOC v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 36. Fenney, 442 U.S. at 279 (citations omitted). 
 37. See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 207 (“It seems strange to view the city of New Haven 
as canceling the test because it wanted to disadvantage the white firefighters, although New 
Haven certainly knew that that would be the result. A better reading of the facts (or at least a 
plausible one) is that New Haven acted to avoid disparate impact liability despite the ‘adverse 
effects upon and identifiable group’ of whites.” (citations omitted)). 
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The Court further eased the proof requirements of a disparate 
treatment case. Violating the Ricci “color-blind” standard appears to 
establish disparate treatment liability even if there is an affirmative 
finding that the motivation of the decisionmaker had nothing to do 
with its adverse effect on the plaintiffs challenging the decision as 
discriminatory. In Ricci, Justice Kennedy accepted, as a matter of 
law, that the City’s explanation for its action, which was to avoid 
disparate impact liability to minority group members, was the actual 
motivation for its decision not to use the results of the test for 
promotion.38 But, if that explanation were true, there would be no 
basis for concluding that the City’s reason was “solely because the 
higher scoring candidates were white.” If the reason was “solely 
because the higher scorers where white,” it would be impossible to 
also conclude that the City was motivated by a desire not to create 
an adverse impact on the members of minority groups. Thus, there is 
an apparent contradiction between the finding that the City’s action 
was motivated by a desire to avoid disparate impact liability against 
minority test takers and the conclusion that the motivation for the 
City’s decision was “solely because the higher scoring candidates 
were white” if the prior distinction between actions taken “because 
of” versus “in spite of” still pertains.  
All of this reinforces the new thrust of disparate treatment law: 
Liability is established to those adversely affected if it is found that 
the decisionmaker acted knowing the racial consequences of its 
decision. That remains true even if there are affirmative findings that 
the decisionmaker was motivated by some reason other than the 
intent to discriminate against the plaintiff or against anyone else. 
Liability attaches even in face of a finding that the motivation for the 
decision was “well intentioned and benevolent” and was made “in 
spite of” rather than “because of” its impact on the plaintiffs. All this 
supports the conclusion that Ricci establishes a “color-blind” 
standard of liability: Knowing the race of those affected by a decision 
violates that standard and anyone adversely affected by that decision 
can bring a Ricci-style disparate treatment claim. 
Justice Alito, in his concurrence, which was joined by Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, goes much further in unlinking disparate 
treatment liability from any focus on the race of the individuals 
 
 38. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682–83 (2009). While accepting that 
explanation as true, the Court, nevertheless, held it inadequate as a defense to plaintiffs’ 
disparate treatment claim. 
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affected. He acknowledges that the City claimed that its motive was 
to avoid disparate impact liability.39 He calls that the decision’s 
objective motivation, because that is the one the City announced in 
public and relied on as a defense to this case.40 But he goes behind 
that announced motive and argues that the City advanced this 
disparate impact rationale as a pretext to hide its real reason, which 
was that the mayor was bending to political pressure in the 
community, particularly pressure brought by a politically powerful 
African-American minister.41 In other words, the hidden, but actual 
motivation was not an intent to discriminate against, or in favor of, 
any of the test takers but was made for political reasons with the 
result affecting all the test takers of all three racial groups, some 
positively and some negatively. Nevertheless, for Justice Alito that 
motive suffices to establish disparate treatment liability to adversely 
affected test takers because the political pressure was tinged with 
race.  
If caving in to political pressure, even pressure that is racially 
motivated by those exerting it, is the true motivation for the City’s 
decision, that would be, at least under preexisting law, a successful 
rebuttal to the claim that the City acted “solely because the higher 
scoring candidates were white” and would be a basis to deny 
disparate treatment liability to all those adversely affected by the 
decision. Justice Alito’s reasoning in Ricci is at odds with Hazen 
Paper Co. v. Biggins.42 There, the Court, in an age discrimination 
case, held that an illegitimate, even unlawful, motivation to deny the 
plaintiff his pension was not evidence relevant to proving age 
discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act.43 If pension discrimination was the sole motivation for the 
employer’s action, that meant for the Hazen Paper Court that there 
was no evidence supporting finding discrimination “as a result of . . . 
age.”44 Based on the law established in Hazen Paper, Justice Alito’s 
argument would not be a basis for plaintiffs’ disparate treatment 
claim but would appear to provide a good defense for the City.  
 
 39. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2684 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 40. Id. at 2683–84. 
 41. Id. at 2683–88. 
 42. 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
 43. Id. at 612–13. 
 44. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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From the point of view of the preexisting law, the City’s best 
defense may have been to admit that the City gave in to political 
pressure and that responding to that pressure was the sole motivation 
for its decision not to use the test scores for promotions. If accepted 
as true, that would undercut any basis for finding an intent to 
discriminate “solely because the higher scoring candidates were 
white” or because of the race of any of the test takers. It would have 
taken the case outside of Title VII.45 Of course, decisions can be 
motivated by more than one factor, but there was no evidence of a 
factor other than racial politics and the subjective intent to not 
disadvantage African American test takers. Whether or not what 
Justice Alito claims was the motivation for the City’s action is true, 
his position does not support, but rather undermines, a finding that 
the City acted with intent to discriminate against the Ricci plaintiffs, 
assuming the preexisting law applied. The best interpretation of 
Justice Alito’s position is that a defendant commits disparate 
treatment discrimination if race enters the decisionmaking process in 
any way and the decision adversely affects anyone. This step—to 
prohibit race from ever being considered for any reason if the 
resulting action adversely affects anyone without regard to the race 
of that person—although taken by only three members of the Court, 
points out the extreme direction the Court appears to be taking 
disparate treatment law under this newly minted “color-blind” 
standard.46  
Even without Justice Alito’s extreme position, the first three 
statements of Justice Kennedy’s opinion support the finding that 
disparate treatment discrimination exists if an employer knows the 
consequences, in terms of the racial groups affected, of an action that 
it takes. This new “color-blind” standard of liability is bolstered by 
the Court’s rejection, sub silentio, of much of preexisting disparate 
treatment doctrine that had constrained the scope of application of 
disparate treatment law to adverse employment decisions that were 
 
 45. Ironically, the decision not to use the test scores might be vulnerable to attack as 
disparate impact against the white test takers. See generally Charles A. Sullivan, The World 
Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505 
(2004). 
 46.  Should Justice Alito’s approach be extended to apply in equal protection cases, the 
decisionmaking by virtually every governmental actor would be subject to challenge as 
discrimination if the actor knew the racial consequences of its actions. That would potentially 
cripple the ability to govern. 
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based on an intent to discriminate and were “because of” and not 
“in spite of” the race of those adversely affected.  
 
4. [A]fter the tests were completed, the raw racial results 
became the predominant rationale for the City’s refusal to 
certify the results.47 
 
While the first three statements are grouped near the beginning 
of the legal analysis in the opinion, the last three come near the 
conclusion when Justice Kennedy is summing up why the City’s 
action constituted disparate treatment. The fourth statement 
reinforces the earlier conclusion that the decisive factual finding, 
made as a matter of law, was that the City acted because it knew the 
“raw racial results” of the test and what the use of those results 
would mean in terms of promotions to lieutenant and captain.48 But 
the City knew and acted based on the results of the test for all three 
racial groups—the promotion rates for African Americans and 
Hispanics were too low, i.e., the test resulted in disparate impact, 
compared to the higher scoring whites. But not all Hispanics, 
African Americans, or, for that matter, all whites, scored either high 
enough to be promotable or too low to be promoted. Acting on 
such “raw racial results” triggered the finding that the decision was 
because of race. However, the Court points to no evidence, other 
than the City’s knowledge of the racial consequences of the action it 
took, that the City acted the way it did to discriminate against the 
white test takers at all and especially because they were white. What 
is true is that the City’s action, which the Court found it had taken 
to avoid disparate impact claims by minority group members, had an 
inevitable effect on all the higher scoring test takers, including, but 
not limited to, the white test takers.  
Under the Ricci “color-blind” standard, simply knowing the 
consequences of an employer’s action is the harm to be prohibited 
by disparate treatment law. If the goal of this standard is to expunge 
any and all knowledge of race from governmental decision-making, 
then the race of any of the people affected by any particular action is 
not important. Where race is implicated because of the knowledge of 
the decisionmaker, it is irrelevant whether the action is “because of” 
 
 47. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009). 
 48. Id. 
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or “in spite of” the race of any affected individual: “color-blind” 
means taking race out of the picture entirely.  
While not an affirmative action case, Ricci does show that acting 
benevolently to avoid disparate impact against the member of one 
racial group inevitably affects the members of all the other racial 
groups involved in the decision. More simply, reducing the negative 
impact on the promotability of minority group members has an 
inevitable consequence of increasing the negative impact on the 
majority whenever there is competition among many for only a few 
promotions or other benefits. The Court in Ricci finds that negative 
impact to be disparate treatment against the members of the white 
racial group, even if there was no intent to discriminate against them, 
at least as that term had been used up until Ricci. Presumably, 
actions that favor members of the white race and have negative 
impact on minority group members will also trigger liability if the 
decisionmaker knows that is the consequence of its actions. In other 
words, an employer is liable whichever way the decision cuts, if the 
decision is made when its racial consequence is known. 
In sum, a “color-blind” standard prohibits decisions when the 
actor knows the racial consequences of its actions on members of all 
racial groups. With that “color-blind” standard, any person, 
regardless of their race, can bring an action if she is adversely affected 
by the employer’s decision. This is a radical expansion in the scope of 
application of disparate treatment law. Indeed, it makes every 
employment decision vulnerable to disparate treatment attack simply 
on the basis of a factual showing that the employer knew the racial 
consequences of its action. The next two statements by the Court 
explore whether or not this new “color-blind” standard is one of 
general application or if any exceptions exist. 
 
5. The injury arises in part from the high, and justified, 
expectations of the candidates who had participated in the 
testing process on the terms the City had established for the 
promotional process. Many of the candidates had studied for 
months, at considerable personal and financial expense, and 
thus the injury caused by the City’s reliance on raw racial 
statistics at the end of the process was all the more severe.49 
 
 
 49. Id.  
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This statement raises the reliance interests or the expectations of 
the test takers that the test results would be used to make 
promotions. Although the Court appears to focus on the facts 
supporting a finding of reliance interests by the Ricci plaintiffs, all of 
the test takers from all three racial groups invested time, effort, and 
money to prepare for the test. What is interesting is that the 
statement of the role of this reliance factor does not seem to rise to 
the level of an element of a Ricci “color-blind” disparate treatment 
claim. Plaintiffs’ reliance made the consequences of the City’s 
decision “all the more severe.”50 Thus, reliance may be a factor but is 
not always necessary to make out a claim. The fact of plaintiffs’ 
reliance was only part of the injury resulting from the City’s violation 
of the “color-blind” standard thus adding to the severity of the 
consequences. Based on that, it can be argued that injury would have 
occurred even if there were no reliance interest established on the 
part of the adversely affected firefighters. If the underlying harm that 
is caused is the violation of the “color-blind” standard, then the 
defeated expectation interest that the “color-blind” standard would 
be used is important only because that shows who was adversely 
affected by the action.  
The scope of application of this Ricci “color-blind” standard will 
depend significantly on whether this reliance aspect of the case 
becomes an element that must be proved to establish a Ricci 
disparate treatment claim. The alternative, as it appears from Justice 
Kennedy’s wording, is that reliance is only a factor that is used to 
weigh the severity of the discrimination.51 If reasonable expectations 
or reliance becomes a separate element needed to be proven to 
establish Ricci disparate treatment discrimination, the Ricci “color-
blind” standard would likely be of more limited application. Suppose 
that after Ricci, a city, in deciding how to promote firefighters to 
lieutenant and captain, announced to the potential test takers that it 
reserved the right to review the test scores before deciding to use 
them. The stated reason for that reservation is to “ensure that all 
groups have a fair opportunity to apply for promotions and to 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Presumably, the severity issue would be relevant to the remedy issues of 
compensatory and punitive damages. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006) (allowing a 
civil rights plaintiff to recover punitive damages against certain employers if the employer 
engaged in a discriminatory practice with malice or reckless indifference to the protected 
rights). 
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participate in the process by which promotions will be made.”52 
Similarly, post-Ricci, well-advised employers may well amend their 
employment policy manuals to include a provision that, because of 
its obligations under antidiscrimination laws and its desire “to 
provide a fair opportunity for all individuals,”53 it reserves the right 
to review the results of any employment practice if the use would 
result in disparate impact on protected groups and to remedy that 
impact if necessary. Announcements or policy manual statements 
along those lines would potentially undermine any expectations that 
the results of the implementation of any employment practice would 
actually be used or be used in the form originally contemplated.  
Any efforts, in terms of time, effort, and money, to establish a 
basis for a reliance element would come up against the employer’s 
announced policy that it is not reasonable for the employees to have 
any expectations based on what they do. Employees, having notice 
of such a reservation, arguably lack any basis for a “legitimate 
expectation not to be judged on the basis of race,”54 even in the 
indirect sense that the actor knew the racial consequences of what 
she was planning to do. Given the deference that the Court has 
given employer promulgated policies, even in the context of 
adhesion contracts,55 Ricci may be rendered of little effect, except as 
a trap for unwary employers who are poorly advised, should reliance 
morph into an element of a Ricci “color-blind” disparate treatment 
claim.  
It would be difficult to predict whether the Court’s deference to 
private ordering by employers would hold up in a case, like Ricci, 
where the Court would have strong empathy for the plaintiffs. 
Assuming facts just like Ricci but with a clear statement that those 
taking the test should not have any expectation that its results would 
be used for promotions, the Court would be faced with a collision of 
 
 52. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677.  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See generally Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) 
(discussing that an age discrimination claim under the ADEA is subject to compulsory 
arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a securities registration application). More 
recently, the Court has abandoned even the need for the fig leaf of consent in adhesion 
contracts and has forced employees into collective bargaining agreement arbitration to which 
they gave no consent at all. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009). See 
generally Margaret L. Moses, The Pretext of Textualism: Disregarding Stare Decisis in 14 Penn 
Plaza v. Pyett, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 825 (2010) (critiquing Pyett). 
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two of its policies: one is the newly minted “color-blind” standard of 
Ricci and the other would be its high deference to employer private 
ordering of the employment setting.56 The race of those adversely 
affected by a decision not to use the test scores may be very relevant 
to the outcome.57 Justice Kennedy, for the majority, appeared to 
emphasize the equities of the high scoring white firefighters.58 Justice 
Ginsburg agreed that empathy toward the white test takers was 
important but she also stressed the equities of the minority 
firefighters who had long been victims of exclusion and 
discrimination by the New Haven fire department.59 All the test 
takers, without regard to their race or to how well they scored on the 
test, had invested time, effort, and money preparing to take the test. 
It would be highly ironic if racially selective empathy factored into 
the application of what is supposed to be a “color-blind” standard.60 
Even in absence of a disclaimer in an employment policy manual, 
the instances in which employees might be found to have established 
reliance interests may be limited. Although posting the scheduling of 
a promotion test at least lets potential test takers know of the test 
and makes “clear the[] selection criteria,”61 employers quite 
frequently undertake the implementation of employment practices 
without notice of any kind to the potentially affected employees. In 
 
 56. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677. 
 57. This has led Primus to make an interesting argument: the context, particularly the 
race of the plaintiffs, of the next disparate treatment case to get before the Supreme Court may 
determine the scope of the Ricci “color-blind” standard. See Primus, supra note 4. If the next 
case getting to the Court is brought by minority plaintiffs, Primus suggests that the Court 
might stop short of clearly adopting a general “color blind” standard. But, he thinks, if the 
case is brought by whites, the Court may take that step. This goes to the point raised by Harris 
& West-Faulcon, supra note 4, that the Court has refocused discrimination law to protect 
whites. 
 58. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677. 
 59. Id. at 2690–91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 60. See Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 4. A backdrop is the role of the unconscious 
in shaping the perceptions of everyone, Supreme Court Justices included. See generally Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination 
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995). Recently this issue has 
focused on the use of evidence of “implicit bias” by way of expert testimony. See generally 
David L. Faigman et al., A Matter of Fit: The Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit 
Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1389 (2008); Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: 
Social Framework Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM. L. REV. 
37 (2009). For a broader context, see Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1529886. 
 61. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677. 
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those situations, it would be difficult for an employee bringing a 
Ricci “color-blind” case if she had to prove reliance as an element. A 
good example would be promotions. Unlike civil service systems like 
the one involved in Ricci, many, maybe most, employers undertake 
to evaluate employees for purposes of making promotion decisions 
without even announcing that that is what they are doing, much less 
making clear the selection criteria that are being used.62 Another 
example is hiring where criteria are frequently not set forth or not set 
forth very clearly. If reliance is an element, it could be argued that 
the affected employees in these situations lack any reliance basis that 
might trigger the Ricci “color-blind” standard.  
Perhaps the reason for the qualified language used by Justice 
Kennedy to describe the role of the plaintiffs’ reliance interests is that 
the Court was bolstering its conclusion that these plaintiffs were 
actually adversely affected by the decision not to use the test results. 
Some courts find that only “ultimate” employment decisions, such as 
discharges, satisfy the adverse employment action element of the 
disparate treatment law preexisting Ricci.63 Deciding not to 
implement the results of a promotion procedure would not satisfy 
those courts. Justice Kennedy may have been responding to the 
notion that nothing actually happened to these plaintiffs, at least 
nothing sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action. 
Where a more clear-cut impact resulted from the challenged 
decision,64 there would be no need to point out that the plaintiff had 
established a reliance interest. 
Finally, while the Court emphasized the reliance interests that 
the Ricci plaintiffs had established by their long, hard, and expensive 
preparation for the promotion test, the language Justice Kennedy 
used to describe this interest did not turn on reliance interest in the 
sense of the effort test takers took to prepare for the test. Instead, 
there was a general statement of “an employee’s legitimate 
 
 62.  Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), involves a class 
action challenge to the promotion practices of the employer claiming that those practices were 
unstructured and without clearly stated criteria which allowed supervisors to discriminate 
consciously and unconsciously in making promotion decisions.  
 63. For an excellent analysis of the issue, see Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis 
Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121 (1998). 
 64. See generally Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (discussing disparate impact 
plaintiffs who were rejected from further participation in a hierarchical promotion system 
because they failed the written test that they challenged). 
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expectation not to be judged on the basis of race.”65 Given the 
general prohibition of race discrimination in employment established 
in Title VII and in 42 U.S.C. § 1981, it can be argued that all 
employees, all the time, have a legitimate expectation not to be 
discriminated against in their employment on the basis of race. If 
employees always have such an expectation, then reliance would not 
be a separate element of a Ricci claim just as it is not an element of 
any other theory of Title VII liability.  
The development of this reliance issue will, in the future, be one 
of the biggest variables in the ultimate scope of Ricci “color-blind” 
disparate treatment claims of discrimination. The soft language used 
in describing the issue suggests that it is not to be taken as too 
significant of an issue. But that same soft language opens up a range 
of discretion, the exercise of which may depend in fact on the 
strength of the particular reliance interests that plaintiffs can prove or 
the empathy they receive from a court.  
 
6. Nor do we question an employer’s affirmative efforts to 
ensure that all groups have a fair opportunity to apply for 
promotions and to participate in the process by which 
promotions will be made. But once that process has been 
established and employers have made clear their selection 
criteria, they may not then invalidate the test results, thus 
upsetting an employee’s legitimate expectation not to be 
judged on the basis of race. . . . Title VII does not prohibit 
an employer from considering, before administering a test or 
practice, how to design that test or practice in order to 
provide a fair opportunity for all individuals, regardless of 
their race.66 
 
Unlike the ambiguity as to the role of reliance, this statement 
does appear to establish a limit on the scope of application of the 
Ricci “color-blind” standard of disparate treatment discrimination: 
the employer may, during the initial design phase setting up a new 
employment practice, investigate the potential consequences that its 
use might produce, including its consequence in terms of race, in 
 
 65. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677. 
 66. Id.  
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2010 1:04:18 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
1286 
order to allow the employer to plan, in light of that knowledge, how 
to provide a fair opportunity for everyone.67 
Justice Kennedy does not explicitly say that during the design 
phase the employer is safe even though it knows the race of those 
potentially affected. But he does say that the employer can design its 
employer practices “in order to provide a fair opportunity for all 
individuals, regardless of their race.”68 The relatively clear import of 
what he said is that during the design phase of an employment 
practice, the employer can know and take account of the racial 
consequences of its ultimate use of that practice. Thus, the Court did 
not “question an employer’s affirmative efforts to ensure that all 
groups have a fair opportunity to apply for promotions and to 
participate in the process by which promotions will be made.”69 
Since employers are prohibited by Title VII from engaging in 
disparate impact discrimination, one aspect of providing a fair 
opportunity to all is to avoid unjustified disparate impact against the 
members of any racial group, including, perhaps, whites.70  
It appears to be Justice Kennedy’s view that an employer does 
not violate the “color-blind” standard if, before a practice is actually 
used, the employer reviews the likely racial consequences of the 
employment practice in order to shield itself from disparate impact 
liability and to provide equal opportunity to everyone. Ex ante, it is, 
 
 67. Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, appears not to accept the design phase 
exception that the Court adopts: 
To be sure, the disparate-impact laws do not mandate imposition of quotas, but it is 
not clear why that should provide a safe harbor. Would a private employer not be 
guilty of unlawful discrimination if he refrained from establishing a racial hiring 
quota but intentionally designed his hiring practices to achieve the same end? Surely 
he would. Intentional discrimination is still occurring, just one step up the chain. 
Government compulsion of such design would therefore seemingly violate equal 
protection principles. Nor would it matter that Title VII requires consideration of 
race on a wholesale, rather than retail, level. 
Id. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring). For Justice Scalia, the design phase is no different for 
purposes of disparate treatment liability because it is “just one step up the chain.” Id. Further, 
considering the racial consequences on all the racial groups involved violates Title VII because 
it is “consideration of race on a wholesale, rather than retail, level.” Id. Thus, Justice Scalia 
would not accept the “visible-victims” interpretation of Ricci advanced by Richard Primus. 
Primus, supra note 4, at 1369. 
 68. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677 (majority opinion). 
 69. Id.  
 70. Title VII protects everyone from race discrimination. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). For an argument that, to survive equal protection attack, 
the disparate impact provisions of § 703(k) of Title VII have to apply to whites as well as 
members of minority groups, see Sullivan, supra note 45. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2010 1:04:18 PM 
1257 Ricci’s “Color-Blind” Standard 
 1287 
of course, not always clear whether the future use by an employer of 
a particular practice will, or will not, result in disparate impact 
discrimination. But, it appears that investigating the potential 
impact, which requires that the employer know the racial groups that 
would be subjected to the practice and predict the impact upon 
them, does not trigger disparate treatment discrimination. Another 
way of looking at why racial consequences may be investigated 
during the design phase is not that this period is an exception to the 
“color-blind” definition of the intent element of a disparate 
treatment claim but instead it reflects that, at this stage, no one has 
yet suffered an adverse employment action, a separate element in a 
disparate treatment case.71 
IV. THE ELEMENTS OF A RICCI “COLOR-BLIND” STANDARD OF 
DISPARATE TREATMENT 
Where it applies, Ricci does seem to have tremendous potential 
for changing the approach to proving intentional discrimination that 
can work to the advantage of plaintiffs generally: A plaintiff can 
establish disparate treatment liability simply by proving that (1) the 
defendant knew the racial consequences of its decision—violating 
“color-blindness” is equated with the traditional intent to 
discriminate element; (2) it then made that decision in light of that 
knowledge—making the decision “because of race”; and (3) the 
plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action taken by the 
defendant.  
Proving that the defendant knew the racial consequences of its 
action either satisfies the traditional intent to discriminate element, 
or replaces it with an easy to prove factual question. Traditionally, 
intent to discriminate has been the hardest element of a disparate 
treatment case to prove.72 In a Ricci “color-blind” case, that element 
becomes simply a question of the defendant’s knowledge, without 
more, of the racial consequences of its potential action.73 Not only is 
 
 71. See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 208. 
 72. For a description of the various ways of proving intent to discriminate to which the 
Ricci approach should be added, see Zimmer, supra note 20. 
 73. Even under the newly announced and more stringent fact pleading requirement 
announced in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), a plaintiff relying on a Ricci “color-
blind” claim would merely have to plead that the defendant knew her race when it made the 
decision she is challenging as discriminatory. Pleading sufficient facts to support the intent to 
discriminate element under preexisting law would appear to be much more difficult. 
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plaintiff’s burden of proving intent vastly simplified, “because of 
race” is simply established by that knowledge followed by a decision 
by the defendant. In other words, acting while knowing the racial 
consequences of a decision equals acting “because of race.”74 The 
Court’s approach knocks out any need to focus on linking 
defendant’s intent to the plaintiff and her race. “Because of race” is 
satisfied simply by the fact that the defendant knew the racial 
consequences of the situation and then acted, even if the effect on 
the plaintiff was “in spite of” her race, with no need to prove it was 
“because of plaintiff’s race.”  
Under prior law, the “because of” race element was used in the 
sense that the defendant’s intent had to be shown to be focused on 
the race of the plaintiff. Now, acting “because of race” in the 
abstract sense of knowing the consequences in terms of the race of 
those affected, without any focus on the plaintiff or her race, suffices 
to establish the second element of a Ricci case. The third element, 
that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, may even 
have been made easier for plaintiffs. While the Supreme Court has 
yet to rule on the question, there is some authority among the lower 
courts that only serious employment actions—some say “ultimate” 
ones like discharge—are sufficiently adverse to sustain a disparate 
treatment action.75 In Ricci, nothing actually happened to the 
plaintiffs when the City decided not to use the test scores. What they 
lost was a promotional opportunity, which, presumably, would be 
replaced with a different procedure that would likely give them 
another opportunity to be promoted. In other words, it may be that 
all they suffered was a delayed promotion or a lowered chance for 
promotion.76 
 
 74. In his separate concurring opinion, which suggests that the disparate impact 
provisions of antidiscrimination laws may violate equal protection, Justice Scalia appears to 
confirm the ease with which disparate treatment can be established: “Title VII’s disparate-
impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the 
racial outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on (because of) those racial 
outcomes. That type of racial decisionmaking is, as the Court explains, discriminatory.” Ricci, 
129 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring). In Ricci, the City put “a racial thumb on the 
scales” and evaluated the racial outcome if the test results were used. Acting on that knowledge 
was disparate treatment discrimination that the Ricci plaintiffs could challenge because they 
were adversely affected by it.  
 75. See Minor v. Centocor, Inc., 457 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2006), for a description of some 
of the “adverse employment action” jurisprudence.  
 76. See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 208. 
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In other words, Ricci can be argued to have established disparate 
treatment as a strict liability offense: Liability attaches by showing 
the employer violated the “color-blind” standard by taking action 
knowing the race of those affected, which action adversely affected 
an employee or applicant. If the City in fact made its decision to 
avoid disparate impact liability to minority test takers, as the Court 
found as a matter of law, or, if that explanation was a pretext for a 
decision to give in to community political pressure as argued by 
Justice Alito,77 that would make no difference for finding liability 
under this new “color-blind” standard. Since the harm is acting with 
knowledge of the racial consequences, it makes no difference even if 
there was not any focus on the white test takers who got high scores 
on the test, on the Ricci plaintiffs, or on the two Hispanics and three 
African Americans who were disadvantaged by the decision not to 
use the test scores for promotion. If disparate treatment 
discrimination is now based on strict liability, all of those issues that 
have proved so daunting under preexisting disparate treatment law 
are rendered irrelevant at least to the extent this new “color-blind” 
standard applies. 
While the role of a reliance or expectations factor is not clear, 
there appears to be one exception to the scope of the Ricci “race-
blind” standard, and that is the narrow ground that during the 
design phase of an employment practice an employer can investigate, 
come to know and to act on its potential racial consequences. 
Presumably, this is an affirmative defense to be proven by the 
defendant. Up to that point, no one has been adversely affected. 
Once the design phase of the employment practice is completed and 
it is set in place, thereafter the knowledge of the racial consequences 
is enough, by itself, to establish that the decision and the resulting 
action was “because of race.” Those who could show that they were 
adversely affected by that decision—here the Ricci plaintiffs, among 
others—would establish liability. While apparently not an element of 
a Ricci “color-blind” disparate treatment claim, the fact that the 
plaintiffs acted in reliance on the City’s plan to use the test results for 
promotions adds to the injury flowing from a decision that was made 
“because of race.”  
In sum, the Court appears to have created a new, “color-blind” 
standard of disparate treatment discrimination that imposes a prima 
 
 77. Only Justices Scalia and Thomas joined in Justice Alito’s concurring opinion.  
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facie case of strict liability on an employer who acted knowing the 
race of those affected. The Court appears to have recognized two 
defenses that would overcome the prima facie case: (1) if the use of 
race took place during the design phase of an employment policy or 
practice or (2) if there is a “strong basis in evidence” that the 
defendant would be liable for disparate impact liability under Title 
VII.78  
V. ADDITIONAL NEW HAVEN FIREFIGHTER TESTING CASES 
Two more cases, one pending in court and the other at the 
E.E.O.C. administrative stage, have arisen because the City has now 
implemented the test results to fill the existing lieutenant and captain 
openings.79 Trying to apply the new Ricci “color-blind” standard to 
them may help to develop the architecture of this new disparate 
treatment theory. One case that was already brought in federal court, 
Briscoe v. City of New Haven,80 was a disparate impact challenge to 
the weight given to the written and oral portions of the test. 
Plaintiff, an African-American firefighter who took the test at the 
same time as the Ricci plaintiffs, claims that he would have been 
promoted if the weighting formula had been modified because the 
60/40 formula favoring the written over the oral component had a 
disparate impact on African-Americans. He has now been adversely 
affected because the City has used the test results for the available 
promotions to lieutenant and captain positions. Further, he claims 
that, based on prior experience using the same weighting formula, 
 
 78. Even though using the test results would result in a prima facie case of disparate 
impact discrimination, the Court found that the City failed to satisfy the “strong basis in 
evidence” defense to disparate treatment liability because the test satisfied the job-related and 
consistent with business necessity defense in §703(k) and disparate impact plaintiffs would not 
be able to show that there was an available alternative that the City had failed to use. Ricci, 
129 S. Ct. at 2677–78. 
 79. See Daniel Schwartz, Wait, There’s ANOTHER Firefighter Race Discrimination Case 
in New Haven? (Yes, and the Conn. Supreme Court Just Ruled On It), CONN. EMP. L. BLOG, 
Dec. 9, 2009, http://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/2009/12/articles/decisions-and-
rulings/wait-theres-another-firefighter-race-discrimination-case-in-new-haven-yes-and-the 
conn-supreme-court-just-ruled-on-it/. 
 80. No. 3:09-cv-1642, 2010 WL 2794212, at *8 (D. Conn. July 12, 2010) (case 
dismissed because “the Supreme Court in Ricci specifically anticipated and explicitly foreclosed 
subsequent disparate impact suits” against the City based on the test that was at issue in that 
case). The order of the Supreme Court in Ricci is an example of the interference with the 
proper discretion of district courts that is criticized as excessive judicial activism by Paul 
Gewirtz, Supreme Court Press, N.Y. TIMES, Op-Ed, Tuesday, July 6, 2010, at A-19.  
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the City knew, even before it decided to use a written test for 
promotions, that this 60/40 weighting would result in a disparate 
impact on minority group members. Nothing was done about the 
weighting issue because it was a long-standing feature of the 
collective bargaining agreement between the City and the 
firefighters’ union.81  
Briscoe’s claim of impact is that, of the seventy-seven candidates 
for the lieutenant position, he scored the highest on the oral part of 
the exam, but that his overall score using the 60/40 weighting left 
him twenty-fourth on the list and thus not eligible to be promoted. 
His complaint alleges: 
The City did not believe that the 60 percent weighting that it 
required was job related, and it knew . . . that the weighting would 
have a disparate impact on African-American candidates: for 
example, on the lieutenant exam immediately preceding the 2003 
exam, the African-American candidates as a group performed 
substantially better than the white candidates on the oral exam, but 
they were scored much lower overall because of the 60 percent 
weighting given to the written test.82 
Briscoe raises some interesting questions. It appears that plaintiff 
framed his approach in Briscoe to avoid any preclusive effect from 
one rather obtuse sentence of Justice Kennedy’s opinion dealing 
with any subsequent disparate impact action arising from the test at 
issue in Ricci. That sentence is in the second to last paragraph: 
 
If, after it certifies the test results, the City faces a disparate-impact 
suit, then in light of our holding today it should be clear that the 
City would avoid disparate-impact liability based on the strong 
basis in evidence that, had it not certified the results, it would have 
been subject to disparate-treatment liability.83 
 
 
 81. The fact that the City had a contractual obligation to the union to use the 60/40 
weighting formula would not be a defense to a Title VII claim. 
 82. Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief, ¶ 5, No. 3:09-cv-1642 (D. Conn. 
filed October 15, 2009). 
 83. Ricci v. DeStafano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009). The district judge relied on this 
sentence to dismiss Briscoe’s suit, see supra note 78. For an extended discussion on the 
meaning of this sentence for the future of disparate impact law, see Seiner & Gutman, supra 
note 4. 
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While his is a disparate impact case, the Briscoe claim is focused 
on the time period before the test was administered, i.e., during the 
design phase. In contrast, Ricci focused on the implementation of 
the test and its results. The potential disparate impact of the 
weighting formula was not at issue in Ricci.84 Why Justice Kennedy’s 
sentence is inscrutable is that, in Ricci, seventeen white and one 
Hispanic plaintiffs ultimately prevailed by claiming that they were 
victims of intentional disparate treatment discrimination when the 
defendant decided not to use the results of its promotion procedure. 
The City’s defense was that using the test scores would cause a 
disparate impact on minority test takers. But the African-American, 
Hispanic, and white test takers who were benefited by the City’s 
decision not to use the test scores, including Briscoe, were not party 
to Ricci. Generally, only parties to an action are bound by a 
judgment in that action but, nevertheless, there is an argument that 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides for preclusion.85 The 
 
 84. The only reference to the weighting issue in Justice Kennedy’s opinion is as to the 
question of whether the City had a strong basis in evidence that it would be liable for disparate 
impact because minority group challengers to the implementation of the test would succeed in 
proving, pursuant to § 703(k)(1)(A)(ii), that a different weighting formula was an alternative 
employment practice and the “employer refuses to adopt [that] available alternative 
employment practice.” Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673. 
 85. In dismissing Briscoe, the court did not address the procedural issues involved; 
rather, it simply did what the Supreme Court said to do: dismiss all other disparate impact 
cases based on the Ricci test. See supra note 78. For a discussion of those procedural issues, see 
Sullivan, supra note 4, at 213–214. The preclusion issue ultimately turns on the impact of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), which overruled 
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). Ironically, Martin v. Wilks was another firefighters’s 
case, again involving white plaintiffs. The white firefighters were negatively affected by actions 
taken by the City of Birmingham to implement a consent decree it had agreed to with the 
N.A.A.C.P. that settled a discrimination claim by African-American firefighters. The actions of 
the City that the white plaintiffs’ challenged in Martin v. Wilks were those that benefited black 
firefighters, which they claimed disadvantaged them. Because the white firefighters were not 
party to the action leading to the consent decree nor to the decree itself, the Court found that 
they were not precluded by that decree from bringing a discrimination action. But Martin v. 
Wilks is no longer good law.  See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 249 (1994) 
(recognizing that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 overruled Martin). 
  The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §2000-e(n), provided two scenarios by 
which these disparate impact plaintiffs might be barred. The first is whether they had “actual 
notice of the proposed judgment” that “might adversely affect their interests” and they had a 
“reasonable opportunity to present objections.” Because the Supreme Court granted summary 
judgment in Ricci, which was the first time the City lost, there was no opportunity for the 
disparate impact plaintiffs to present their objections. But the question would be whether the 
potential for adverse action resulting from the Ricci case as it was working its way up to the 
Supreme Court should have clued them to the risk that their interests “might” be adversely 
affected. In other words, a lot depends on the meaning given the word “might.”   
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allegations in Briscoe’s claim is that the events he is challenging all 
occurred (1) before the test was finalized or administered; (2) before 
any potential test takers had invested time, effort and money to 
prepare for a test that had yet to be implemented in any way; (3) 
before the consequences in terms of the scores of different racial 
groups were known; and (4) before the City decided not to use the 
test results because it knew the racial consequences of using or not 
using the scores.86 If the “design” exception to the Ricci “color-
blind” standard is found to apply, then the fact that the City knew 
the potential racial consequences in terms of the likelihood that the 
60/40 weighting of the written and oral scores would produce a 
disparate impact, would not amount to disparate treatment 
discrimination.87 To the extent that reliance or expectation interests 
are relevant, the City’s determination of how the two aspects of the 
test would be weighted occurred before any expectations had been 
established by any of the firefighters who were interested in 
attempting to be promoted. Thus, disparate impact law would seem 
to apply in Briscoe in its traditional way.88 In other words, Briscoe is 
 
  Alternatively, the question would be whether the City, when defending against the 
white plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claim, had “adequately represented” the disparate impact 
claims of these plaintiffs. The City tried to defend against a judgment on the disparate 
treatment ground by relying on the potential disparate impact liability if it had used the test 
scores. While disparate impact would in some sense be the same legal grounds whether it was 
used offensively or defensively, it seems odd that the earlier legal actions of the party these 
plaintiffs were now suing, the City, would be the basis for precluding their suit. It would seem 
there are due process issues of allowing the fox to guard the chicken coop. The consequence of 
the dismissal of the Briscoe case was that the fox apparently had done a good enough job 
protecting the chickens, in this case, Briscoe and other minority firefighters now adversely 
affected because the City made the promotions based on the test results have lost their chance 
to challenge that implementation, at least on disparate impact grounds. 
 86. See Briscoe v. City of New Haven, No. 3:09-CV-1642 (CSH), 2010 WL 2794212, 
at *4 (D. Conn. July 12, 2010). 
 87. If the design phase exception to the Ricci “color-blind” standard does not apply, the 
City could try to defend its action form attack in Briscoe’s disparate impact claim by arguing 
that the disparate impact provisions in § 703(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k), are 
unconstitutional because they require an employer to know the racial consequences of its use 
of employment practices with that knowledge the basis for a finding that equal protection has 
been violated. See infra Part VI. It would be highly ironic if the City that tried to defend its 
action in Ricci on disparate impact grounds would now turn around and challenge the 
constitutionality of disparate impact law.  
 88. Ironically, by focusing his disparate impact claim on the design phase of the 
promotions procedures to avoid the risk of preclusion, Briscoe may have lost a Ricci “color-
blind” claim of disparate treatment discrimination because such a claim does not apply to the 
design phase of employment practices. As to his disparate impact claim, it would be held timely 
because the implementation of a practice that has a disparate impact can be the basis for a new 
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an example of the design phase exception to the Ricci “color-blind” 
standard of disparate treatment discrimination.  
There is another claim arising out of the test that produced 
Ricci.89 That claim, by a number of African-American test takers who 
took the Ricci test, is that the City’s recent use of the test results to 
promote firefighters to lieutenant and captain positions is disparate 
treatment discrimination.90 By claiming disparate treatment 
discrimination, such a claim appears to escape any preclusive effect, 
at least any based on Justice Kennedy’s rather obscure suggestion 
that disparate impact actions flowing out of the Ricci facts might be 
barred.91 Further, the Ricci “color-blind” approach to proving 
disparate impact appears to apply rather readily. Based on the same 
evidence relied on in Ricci, the six groups of test takers are the same. 
All that has changed is that the valence has flipped: Those white, 
Hispanic and African-American test takers who were advantaged by 
the earlier decision of the City not to use the test scores, including 
these claimants, are now adversely affected because they will not be 
promoted during the life span of the test.  
Since the test results have now been used, those with high scores 
on the test—some of whom were plaintiffs in Ricci—have been 
promoted. Assuming there is no new evidence of subjective intent to 
discriminate because of the race of anyone, the question is whether 
the City is liable for intentional disparate treatment because it has 
now used the test scores for promotions knowing the racial 
consequences of its action. The answer seems to be yes since all three 
elements of the Ricci “color-blind” test of disparate treatment are 
satisfied: (1) the defendant knew the racial consequences of its 
decision, (2) it made the decision to use the test scores with that 
knowledge thus making the decision “because of race,” and (3) the 
 
charge of discrimination. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010). 
 89. The Connecticut Employment Law Blog reported that African-American 
firefighters, who took the test at issue in Ricci but did not score high enough to be promoted, 
have now filed E.E.O.C. charges claiming disparate treatment and impact discrimination 
because those test results have now been used. Daniel A. Schwartz, Black Firefighters Move to 
Intervene in Ricci v. Destefano, CONN EMP. L. BLOG (Nov. 17, 2009), 
http://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/2009/11/articles/decisions-and-rulings/black-
firefighters-move-to-intervene-in-ricci-v-destefano. 
 90. These African-American plaintiffs also claim disparate impact discrimination. 
 91. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009). It may be, however, that the 
lower courts will read the majority as telling them not to allow any further litigation over the 
test challenged in Ricci. 
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plaintiffs suffered adverse employment impact because they have not 
been and will not be promoted. The fact that the adverse impact on 
these plaintiffs was “in spite of” and not “because of” their race 
should make no more difference for these plaintiffs than it did for the 
Ricci plaintiffs.  
The City could try to shift its position to raise as a defense the 
basis for its liability as asserted by Justice Alito in his concurrence: 
That all of its decisions about the entire promotion process were 
motivated by factors that had nothing to do with the race of any of 
the plaintiffs. The argument would be that the decision not to use 
the test was solely motivated by community political pressure put on 
the mayor. Now, the City is solely motivated to act by its need to 
implement the remedy for the Ricci plaintiffs.92 While the majority 
did not address this issue, Justice Alito’s concurrence rejects that as a 
defense to a Ricci “color-blind” action. Acting with knowledge of 
the racial consequences—violating the “color-blind” standard—is the 
key element. It is irrelevant that the actual motivation was not aimed 
at anyone affected by the action but was the result of things that had 
nothing to do with the race of the employees subject to the decision. 
That view is only the view of three of the five Justices in the Ricci 
majority and so Ricci did not decide that issue but the City might 
 
 92. The City could try to defend its use of race by claiming that it was justified by a 
compelling governmental interest to remedy its own discrimination. See United States v. 
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). If successful, this defense would have the odd consequence of 
privileging one group of victims of the City’s disparate treatment—the Ricci plaintiffs who 
were among the first group adversely affected by the City’s violation of the “color-blind” 
standard—over those later affected by a subsequent decision. This would also involve a 
violation of the “color-blind” standard, by providing a remedy only to the first group affected 
by the initial decision. What makes this seem odd is that it would leave it to the defendant to 
decide which group would receive a remedy for its disparate treatment discrimination against 
both groups. 
  If, in the first instance in Ricci, the City had decided to use the test scores for 
promotions while knowing the racial consequences of that decision, those not promoted could 
challenge that decision as disparate treatment discrimination. If successful, those plaintiffs 
would be entitled to a remedy, even though implementing that remedy would entail another 
action violating the “color-blind” standard. The Ricci plaintiffs, along with other test takers 
with high enough scores to be promoted, would be promoted and those adversely affected by 
the decision to use the test results would also be entitled to a remedy for the City’s disparate 
treatment discrimination. 
  If, as happened, the City decided not to use the test scores, it is liable to the Ricci 
plaintiffs. That would shield the City from disparate treatment liability to those adversely 
affected by that decision because the use of race to remedy disparate treatment to the Ricci 
plaintiffs would be justified by the compelling governmental interest in remedying 
discrimination. 
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raise for this new defense. It would, however, be ironic if a court 
would now accept as a defense for the City what three justices 
viewed as a basis for its liability in Ricci. 
Finally, the claim by these African-American test takers does not 
seem to be within the design phase exception that the Court created 
along with its new Ricci “color-blind” approach to disparate 
treatment discrimination. Just like the plaintiffs in Ricci, these 
plaintiffs are challenging an action the City took well after the design 
phase of the employment practice was over. Further, even if reliance 
would be construed to be an element of a Ricci “color-blind” case, 
these plaintiffs had the same reliance and expectation interests as the 
Ricci plaintiffs. They also had spent time, effort, and money 
preparing to take the test in the first place and they had the same 
“legitimate expectation not to be judged on the basis of race.”93 If 
the Ricci plaintiffs’ expectations of not being judged on the basis of 
race were defeated when the City decided not to use the tests to 
avoid disparate impact liability, then these plaintiffs’ expectations of 
not being judged on the basis of race were also defeated now that 
the City has decided to use the tests since the City knew the racial 
consequences of using the test.94 Thus, Ricci’s “color-blind” 
standard applies and the City would seem to be liable under it. 
VI. CIVIL RIGHTS ADVOCATES USE OF THE RICCI “COLOR-BLIND” 
STANDARD 
If the Ricci “color-blind” standard applies to this new disparate 
treatment case as it did in Ricci, this makes the City damned for 
having decided, in the first instance, not to use the test scores 
because it knew the racial consequences of that decision and damned 
now for using the test results, again because it knew the racial 
consequences of that decision.95 At first blush, that may seem unfair 
or somehow wrong. Although Ricci is a substantial change in 
antidiscrimination law, the damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don’t 
outcome is exactly the way a “color-blind” standard appears to work: 
 
 93.  Ricci, 129 S. Ct at 2677. 
 94. Unlike in Ricci, where the decision makers for the City did not know the test scores 
of the individual test takers but only the consequences in terms of the three different racial 
groups, when the City used the test results it did know the individual identity of the test takers, 
including the racial group to which each belonged. 
 95. It is also possible that the City could be damned a third time by losing the Briscoe 
disparate impact case. 
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The violation simply is acting knowing the racial consequences of 
that action.  
How the “color-blind” standard works may be seen by looking 
at the plurality part of Chief Justice Robert’s opinion in the school 
assignment case, Parents Involved, where he appeared to announce a 
“color-blind” standard to be applied in all pupil assignment decision 
making: “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to 
stop discriminating on the basis of race.”96 This seems a slight variant 
of simply describing the “color-blind” standard that Ricci has now 
established as to the meaning of disparate treatment.97 Looking to 
the outcome in Parents Involved, the reason that the section of Chief 
Justice Robert’s opinion is only a plurality opinion is that Justice 
Kennedy did not agree to it. Thus, Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion in Parents Involved is the holding of the Court. Unlike the 
absolute, across-the-board “color-blind” standard asserted by the 
Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy provides an exception to the general 
application of that standard that foreshadows the approach he takes 
for the Court in Ricci. He makes the following point in Parents 
Involved:  
In the administration of public schools by the state and local 
authorities it is permissible to consider the racial makeup of schools 
and to adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body, 
one aspect of which is its racial composition. If school authorities 
are concerned that the student-body compositions of certain 
schools interfere with the objective of offering an equal educational 
opportunity to all of their students, they are free to devise race-
conscious measures to address the problem in a general way and 
without treating each student in different fashion solely on the basis 
of a systematic, individual typing by race.98 
Thus, in both Parents Involved and Ricci, race conscious decision 
making does not constitute a violation either of equal protection or 
disparate treatment law as long as that consciousness occurs during 
the planning stage of school assignments or of employment 
promotion procedures. Race consciousness, at least by itself, is not 
 
 96. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 
(2007).  
 97. For an argument that post-Ricci disparate treatment and equal protection standards 
are the same, see Primus, supra note 4, at 1345–46. 
 98. 551 U.S. at 788–89 (citation omitted). 
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prohibited early on, before identifiable individuals know that they are 
affected.  
Richard Primus calls this his “visible victims” reading of Ricci.99 
Primus suggests that this may reflect an underlying equal protection 
value and is not merely a compromise position of the Justice who 
straddles the middle of a sharply divided Court. Primus argues that 
“[e]qual protection aims to reduce the public salience of race. When 
considering the constitutionality of a race-conscious intervention, it 
is therefore useful to ask whether the measure will reduce or 
exacerbate the racial divides within the American public.”100 When 
individuals know that they are likely to be affected by action taken 
when the racial consequences are known, that, for Primus, increases 
the salience of race. That exacerbates, rather than minimizes or 
reduces, the racial divide in our society. Accordingly, the salience of 
race is increased when students (and their parents) know that they 
were individually assigned to one particular school rather than 
another because of their race and that students of another race are 
assigned to that first school rather than the second one because of 
their race. Similarly, the salience of race increases when workers take 
a promotion test but have their expectations for the use of the test 
deflated when the test scores are not used because of the impact on 
some other racial group.  
To the extent this reduction of the salience of race rationale is 
now the driving force of equal protection as well as disparate 
treatment law, racial salience is increased, not reduced, when 
members of different racial groups are affected by an action taken 
with consciousness of the racial consequences.101 This helps explain 
the Ricci “color-blind” standard as well as the design phase 
exception that Justice Kennedy establishes to that standard. The 
planning process used to decide where to build schools and how to 
draw pupil assignment zones as well as the design phase of new 
employment practices, such as promotion procedures, does not have 
 
 99. See Primus, supra note 4, at 1369. 
 100. Id. at 1371. 
 101. An interesting empirical question would be to measure the intensity of reaction to a 
decision, for example, not to promote firefighters to lieutenant and captain positions because 
of budgetary problems of the employer versus the reaction in a situation like Ricci. If the 
reaction is markedly more intense in a Ricci-type scenario than in the budget crunch situation, 
this would seem to support Primus’ theory that race is a particularly hot issue. The question 
then would be whether a “color-blind” standard in fact would reduce the salience of race. 
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any individuals identified by their race who are affected by any action 
that is taken at that time.  
Once the schools are built and their assignment zones 
established, the assignment of individual students to particular 
schools will more likely be perceived as being because of the 
assignment plan and not “because of the race” of individual students, 
even though race entered into the planning process. Similarly, with a 
promotion procedure, the design phase does not involve any 
individualized treatment based on race and so there is a reduced risk 
that race will be salient, even if the design takes into account 
potential racial consequences. Once the procedure is set in place, 
then those who are promoted expect to be promoted by the use of 
the test results and will view attempts at that stage to ameliorate any 
disparate impact to be race-based. Thus, at the individual pupil 
assignment or the implementation of the promotion procedures 
stages, a “color-blind” standard sets in to minimize the focus on 
issues of race. At that point, members of all races have “legitimate 
expectation[s] not to be judged on the basis of race” and so any 
action based on knowledge of its racial consequences violates the 
“color-blind” standard and makes the actor liable to anyone 
adversely affected by the action.102 
This may explain why in Ricci Justice Kennedy dropped the 
preexisting requirement that, to prove disparate treatment 
discrimination, the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant’s action 
was “because of” and not merely “in spite of” plaintiff’s race. “In 
spite of” now suffices because the harm done by violating the “color-
blind” standard is that a decision was made that involved race, even 
if that use of race does not involve any focus on the plaintiff or her 
race. A “color-blind” standard prohibits the consideration of race 
when an action is “because of” the race of anyone, or of race in the 
abstract, not just because of the race of a particular person or group 
of people. To evoke a description from a long gone era, plaintiffs 
who have been adversely affected because a defendant acted knowing 
the race of affected individuals become “private attorneys general”103 
 
 102. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009). 
 103. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 401–02 (1968) (“A Title II [of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964] suit is thus private in form only. When a plaintiff brings an action 
under that Title, he cannot recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for 
himself alone but also as a ‘private attorney general,’ vindicating a policy that Congress 
considered of the highest priority.”). Professor Kerri Stone describes Ricci as an expansion of 
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entitled to challenge the violation of the Ricci “color-blind” 
standard, even in absence of evidence that the defendant acted 
because of their race.  
For civil rights advocates, the establishment of the Ricci “color-
blind” standard makes disparate treatment cases easier to prove, 
assuming the “color-blind” test is applied in a “color-blind” way. 
The members of minority groups for whose protection the 
antidiscrimination statutes were originally enacted should receive, if 
not the same empathy, at least the same protection that the Ricci 
plaintiffs ultimately received.104 Eliminating the need to prove more 
than an employer’s action with knowledge of the racial consequences 
and having that showing suffice to establish that the action was 
“because of race” streamlines disparate treatment actions 
enormously. Applying a general “color-blind” standard—a plaintiff 
need only show that the defendant acted with the knowledge even 
“in spite of” her race—further simplifies disparate treatment cases for 
all plaintiffs. 
From the viewpoint of civil rights advocates, there is now a 
basis—though only supported by a concurring opinion joined by 
three Justices at the right end of the spectrum—for finding disparate 
treatment discrimination even in face of a defendant’s evidence that a 
reason unrelated to the race of the plaintiffs, or of any of the 
employees, was the actual motivation for the action.105 All plaintiffs 
 
“third party standing” and “transferred intent” doctrine in Title VII. Stone, supra note 4. 
 104. Professors Harris and West-Faulcon describe the consequences of Ricci as turning 
antidiscrimination law on its head to protect whites and to make it more difficult for minority 
group members to enforce their rights: 
Although the holding in Ricci is not unambiguous, and in some respects the 
unusual factual predicate may ultimately limit its reach, Ricci reflects a doctrinal 
move towards converting efforts to rectify racial inequality into white racial injury. 
Ricci facilitates this racial project in two distinct but interrelated ways: by whitening 
discrimination—that is reframing anti-discrimination law’s presumptions and 
burdens to focus on disparate treatment of whites as the paradigmatic and ultimately 
preferred claim, and by race-ing efforts to install fair selection measures—that is, 
treating the use of job-related assessment tools that correct racial imbalance and 
better measure merit as racially disparate treatment of whites. 
Harris &West-Faulcon, supra note 4, at 10–11. The easy and quick leap the Court took to find 
disparate treatment liability certainly supports their conclusion. Nevertheless, it is important for 
civil rights advocates to take advantage of that to benefit, if possible, those groups for whom 
the antidiscrimination statutes were originally adopted. It may be that Congress will address 
Ricci in amendments to Title VII or a more comprehensive Civil Rights Act of 2010. But 
pressure to do something may increase if Ricci can be seen as a radical expansion of the scope 
of the antidiscrimination laws to the disadvantage of employers generally.  
 105. Such a holding would require a majority of the Court to accept Justice Alito’s 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2010 1:04:18 PM 
1257 Ricci’s “Color-Blind” Standard 
 1301 
need to prove is that race was in some way implicated and they were 
adversely affected when challenging a decision. Actual intent to 
discriminate against the plaintiffs would be irrelevant because the 
violation would be the failure to make “color-blind” decisions. 
VII. THE POTENTIAL BROADER IMPACT OF RICCI 
By leaping so easily to a finding that the City committed 
disparate treatment discrimination as a matter of law, the Court 
appears, at least potentially, to have revolutionized discrimination 
law because the new “color-blind” approach makes a plaintiff’s 
burden so much easier. Assuming the Court meant what it said in 
Ricci, employers now face tremendous challenges in complying with 
this “color-blind” approach to what constitutes disparate treatment 
discrimination. Up until now, an employer acting with knowledge of 
the racial consequences of that action has not faced much risk of 
liability based on that knowledge alone; much more was needed to 
prove an action was “because of” the race of the plaintiff. Ricci 
changes that. Knowing the racial consequences of an action now 
violates this “color-blind” approach and anyone adversely affected by 
that action could bring a challenge. 
The thrust in the Court toward this “color-blind” standard has 
taken place in cases where the actor has acted benevolently toward 
members of minority groups. Those cases include affirmative action 
cases,106 a school assignment case,107 and now, the Ricci case. Ricci 
did not involve affirmative action favoring members of minority 
groups but instead was a situation where the defendant acted to 
avoid imposing an adverse impact on minority group members.108  
The first big step that needs to be taken to complete the 
revolution of disparate treatment law is for this new “color-blind” 
approach to be applied in claims brought by members of minority 
groups.109 The second round of cases against the City of New Haven 
 
approach that he set forth in his concurring opinion in Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2683 (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 106. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 
(2003) (discussing affirmative action in higher education). 
 107. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 108. In that way it more nearly resembles Parents Involved in which the defendant school 
districts acted on the racial identity of students in assigning them to schools in order to avoid 
racial resegregation. 
 109. A more technical first question may be whether Ricci applies in both systemic and 
individual disparate treatment cases. The Ricci Court speaks of disparate treatment in general 
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may be a good indicator of whether that step will be taken. But 
strategically, at least, there seems to be good reason for members of 
groups protected by the enactment of antidiscrimination laws to 
bring cases based on this new, simplified law of disparate treatment 
discrimination. It would be the highest irony if the courts, 
particularly the Supreme Court, were to reject a “color-blind” or 
equal treatment approach to this new “color-blind” standard.110 
Assuming this “color-blind” standard of disparate treatment 
discrimination applies to claims of race discrimination by members of 
minority groups as well as by whites, the next set of questions is 
whether disparate treatment discrimination now includes “gender-
blind,” “age-blind,” and other such standards.111 While Ricci is a 
statutory interpretation case, the background equal protection issues, 
raised but not decided, may influence the extent to which Ricci’s 
approach is extended to other discrimination issues.  
Consciousness of race, gender, etc., is ubiquitous in our society. 
Because of that, Ricci will put all employment decisions made 
beyond the design phase of an employment policy at risk of being 
challenged as discriminatory because the race or gender of those 
involved are typically known to employers when they make those 
decisions. Proving such consciousness is likely to be easy. All the 
more that is needed is proof that someone is adversely affected by 
the decision. Employers will likely have considerable difficulty 
 
terms and Justice Kennedy does not cite to the iconic individual disparate treatment decision, 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Justice Scalia in his concurrence 
and Justice Ginsburg in her dissent do cite McDonnell Douglas, for what that is worth. 
Certainly nothing in the opinion for the Court suggests that this “color-blind” standard is 
limited to systemic cases or that it does not apply to individual disparate treatment cases. 
 110. In Bush v. Gore, the Rehnquist Court attempted to limit its holding to the particular 
case without presumably any precedential effect: “Our consideration is limited to the present 
circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents 
many complexities.” 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000). Nothing in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the 
Court in Ricci suggests that this decision is without precedential effect. Given the long term 
push by the right wing of both the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts to adopt a “color-blind” 
standard of discrimination, it would be surprising if the Court would deny precedential effect 
to Ricci. But the Court does do surprising things. 
 111. Given the requirements for employers to reasonably accommodate workers because 
of the workers’ religious beliefs and practices under Title VII, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j), 
and because of their disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, § 102(b)(5), 42 
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5), special issues may arise in imposing “religion-blind” or a “disability-
blind” rules. Given the specialized approach to defining an “individual with a disability,” § 
3(1), 42 U.S.C. § 12102, it may be that the entire area of disability discrimination would not 
be affected by the extension of Ricci. 
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complying with this “color-blind” standard. If the approach is 
extended to other issues, such as gender, the risk of liability is greatly 
expanded.  
Some employers, symphony orchestras for example, have 
adopted approaches to the selection of new orchestra members 
where the candidates play behind a curtain so those making the 
decision do not know anything about the race, sex, or age of those 
auditioning. While such a “veil of ignorance”112 approach may work 
for musical groups, it would seem more daunting in the general run 
of employment decision-making. Recently some employers have 
adopted procedures to try to insulate the ultimate decision maker 
from whatever discriminatory influence that may have taken place at 
lower levels.113 Needing to remove all indications of race, gender, 
etc., from such processes will make those attempts all the more 
challenging if the employer is to be insulated from disparate 
treatment liability.  
There have already been calls for action by Congress to overturn 
Ricci.114 Professor Sullivan suggests that Congress could overturn the 
holding that employers would need a “strong basis in evidence” to 
defend against a disparate treatment claim based on the “color-
blind” standard and return to an interpretation that there is no 
conflict between employer compliance with the disparate treatment 
prohibition and the disparate impact one.115 Alternatively, the “good 
faith” standard urged by the concurrence in Ricci might be 
adopted.116 If Ricci is taken seriously, employers would have the 
 
 112. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (introducing the concept 
of a “veil of ignorance”). See also Jean D’Acquila, supra note 4 (highlighting the challenges 
facing employers and their lawyers because of Ricci). 
 113. One circuit has held that an employer is only liable for discrimination if the actual 
decision maker harbored the intent to discriminate, even if underlings who did discriminate 
influenced the final decision. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 354 F.3d 277 (4th 
Cir. 2004) (en banc). For the other circuits the question is whether that decisionmaker is in 
fact fully insulated from the discrimination of those down the hierarchy, with that issue 
described as a question whether the decisionmaker was in fact “the cat’s paw” of the actual 
discriminator. If so, the employer is liable even in absence of proof that the decisionmaker even 
knew of the discriminatory actions that nevertheless influenced the decision. See generally 
Stephen Befort & Alison Olig, Within the Grasp of the Cat’s Paw: Delineating the Scope of 
Subordinate Bias Liability Under Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes, 60 S.C. L. REV. 383 
(2009); Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: 
Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495 (2001). 
 114. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 4.  
 115. Id. at 215. 
 116. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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greatest incentive to push for amendments to the discrimination laws 
to eliminate the “color-blind” standard of liability established in 
Ricci. It might be that a coalition made up of civil rights advocates, 
employers and others interested in discrimination law could be 
formed to propose amendments to Congress in much the same way 
that a coalition of interested parties formed to seek the recent 
amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 2008.117 
Whether or not the antidiscrimination statutes are amended to 
somehow take account of and perhaps overturn Ricci, a potential 
limitation is that the background constitutional question of equal 
protection may then come to the forefront.118 In answering the 
statutory question in favor of the plaintiffs in Ricci, the Court 
avoided having to decide the constitutional question. “Our statutory 
holding does not address the constitutionality of the measures taken 
here in purported compliance with Title VII.”119 Justice Scalia, 
however, says it is only a matter of time until the constitutional 
question must be addressed: The “resolution of this dispute merely 
postpones the evil day on which the Court will have to confront the 
question: Whether, or to what extent, are the disparate-impact 
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 consistent 
with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection? The question 
is not an easy one.”120  
Justice Scalia does, however, lay out the constitutional issue in a 
way that suggests that he would hold those provisions 
unconstitutional: “Title VII’s disparate-impact provisions place a 
racial thumb on the scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the 
racial outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on 
 
 117. See Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
325, 122 Stat. 3553. 
 118. As Ricci came to the Court, it did involve both statutory and constitutional equal 
protection issues: “Petitioners raise a statutory claim, under the disparate-treatment prohibition 
of Title VII, and a constitutional claim, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.” 129 S. Ct. at 2672. 
 119. 129 S. Ct. at 2676. The Court further emphasized that it was not reaching any 
constitutional questions: 
We also do not hold that meeting the strong-basis-in-evidence standard would 
satisfy the Equal Protection Clause in a future case. As we explain below, because 
respondents have not met their burden under Title VII, we need not decide whether 
a legitimate fear of disparate impact is ever sufficient to justify discriminatory 
treatment under the Constitution. 
Id.  
 120. Id. at 2681–82. 
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(because of) those racial outcomes. That type of racial decision 
making is, as the Court explains, discriminatory.”121 Putting “a racial 
thumb on the scales” because employers evaluate the “racial 
outcomes of their policies”—violating the “color-blind” standard—
may, according to Justice Scalia, amount to more than the statutory 
violation the Court found in Ricci.122 It could also be the basis for 
finding that the disparate impact provision of § 703(k) of Title VII is 
unconstitutional. Congress is prohibited from requiring by law the 
violation of equal protection: “[I]f the Federal Government is 
prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race, then surely it is 
also prohibited from enacting laws mandating that third parties—
e.g., employers, whether private, State, or municipal—discriminate 
on the basis of race.”123  
Justice Scalia’s approach is premised on treating the “race-blind” 
standard to be the same for equal protection as the Court found it to 
be in defining disparate treatment under Title VII. None of the 
other justices joined Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion, so it is not 
clear that a majority of the Court would accept that equation.124 If 
Justice Scalia is successful in persuading a majority of the Court that 
the “race-blind” standard applies to equal protection, that would put 
the disparate impact provisions of Title VII as well as any 
amendments aimed at overturning Ricci in jeopardy: An employer 
trying to avoid disparate impact liability would perforce be required 
to know the racial consequences of the employment practice in 
question and that knowledge would, when acted upon, violate the 
“color-blind” standard.  
Any employer, public or private, could challenge the power of 
Congress to enact a law that was at odds with the equal protection 
requirements that apply to the federal government. Assuming a 
prima facie equal protection case, the question would become 
whether the disparate impact provisions are justified by a compelling 
governmental interest. Given the narrow range of interests found 
compelling,125 it is not likely that the Court would find that the 
 
 121. Id. at 2682.  
 122. See id. 
 123. Id. (citations omitted). 
 124. Professor Primus, however, concludes that disparate treatment and equal protection 
now have the same “color-blind” standard. See Primus, supra note 4. 
 125. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
737–40 (3rd ed. 2006) (compelling governmental interests limited to remedying past 
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disparate impact provisions of Title VII would constitute a 
compelling interest. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg points out that 
such an interpretation would be radical.126 And so it would be, 
especially if Congress had been persuaded by a broad coalition of 
groups, including representatives of employers, to overturn Ricci. 
Adopting such a “color-blind” standard for equal protection would 
make all governmental actors vulnerable to attack for actions they 
take in almost every sector of government.127 That is what would 
make the “color-blind” standard of equal protection, if applied in a 
“color-blind” or equal treatment way, so radical.  
It is possible, though very unlikely, that the Court could take 
another, even more radical step. And that would be to extend the 
“color-blind” standard of equal protection to courts.128 Judges 
inevitably need to know the race of the parties to an equal protection 
claim. If the “color-blind” standard applies to courts, then the action 
of a court deciding a case while knowing the racial consequences of 
the decision would violate equal protection. That would mean that 
the equal protection clause would become essentially unenforceable. 
In other words, the strict scrutiny and compelling governmental 
interest approach to equal protection that originated in Korematsu v. 
United States129 would be superseded. Instead, the equal protection 
clause would become unenforceable, just as the privilege or 
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was rendered a 
nullity in the Slaughter House Cases.130 Such a result would be the 
 
discrimination and enhancing educational diversity). 
 126. 129 S. Ct. at 2700 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 127. The governing bodies of every community, every school board or public institution 
and every state with a racially diverse population will know the racial consequences of the 
actions taken. That makes their decision vulnerable to equal protection attack by anyone 
adversely affected by that action.  
 128. Even with Chief Justice Robert’s expansive call for a “color-blind” standard for 
assigning students to schools in the plurality part of his opinion in Parents Involved, he did 
appear to accept the concept of strict scrutiny that could be met with proof of a compelling 
governmental interest. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 720–22 (2007). Justice Kennedy, in Ricci, also looked to the law involving compelling 
governmental interests when he was creating the new “strong basis in evidence” defense to a 
disparate treatment claim. 129 S. Ct. at 2681. 
 129. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 130. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). It would be truly ironic if the equal protection clause was 
rendered unenforceable because the Supreme Court imposed a “color-blind” standard on itself 
along with all other governmental actors at a time when the privilege or immunities clause may 
be taking on new life in the context of the Second Amendment. See McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).  
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final irony because it would mean that the courts would lack the 
capacity to decide cases such as Ricci. And that means that plaintiffs, 
like the Ricci plaintiffs, would be denied any remedy for the 
disparate treatment by their employers.131 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The obvious empathy for the plaintiffs expressed by Justice 
Kennedy in his opinion in Ricci resulted in the Court’s creation of a 
radical new standard of disparate treatment liability. The Court easily 
leaped over preexisting law to reach the conclusion that, as a matter 
of law, these plaintiffs were the victims of disparate treatment 
discrimination. While most of the Court’s opinion dealt with 
disparate impact law and the interrelationship between disparate 
treatment and disparate impact law, the ease with which it found 
disparate treatment may have the ironic effect of opening new 
avenues for civil rights advocates to more easily and therefore more 
successfully bring disparate treatment actions. That this result may be 
an unintended consequence of the Court’s solicitude for these 
particular plaintiffs in Ricci should not forestall every effort to turn 
the tide of antidiscrimination litigation back toward a more 
empathetic treatment of those for whom the legislation was enacted 
to protect.132 
 
 131. This does not mean that the employers did not violate equal protection. But it does 
mean that no governmental actor, including the courts, could do anything about the violation. 
 132.  See Michael J. Zimmer, Systemic Empathy, 34 COLUM. HUMAN RTS. L. REV. 575 
(2003). 
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